Zenawi to West: Don’t force democracy upon Africa, but keep the checks coming

From the Guardian:

Western countries should stop trying to browbeat Kenya's warring political leaders into submission and do more in practical terms to prevent poverty, lack of opportunity, and Islamist terrorism from further destabilising the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, has told the Guardian.

"The threat of western sanctions as a response to the current crisis in Kenya is very, very misguided," Meles said. "If it is presumed that the Kenyans will democratise in order to eat the peanuts of development assistance from the European Union, for example, it would be a big mistake."

Placing pressure on resources to influence the post-election process, which has degenerated into violence amid claims of government-engineered fraud, would not work and could be counter-productive, he said.

So says the man who has been in power since 1995 and whose government received $1.9 billion in bilateral and multilateral aid in 2007, the world’s fifth highest amount.

What does that money buy? Here’s what the U.S. Dept. of State reported about Ethiopia’s 2005 parliamentary elections:

After the May elections, serious human rights abuses occurred, when the opposition parties refused to accept the announced results, and in November after the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) called for civil disobedience, which resulted in widespread riots and excessive use of force by the police and military. Although there were some improvements, the government's human rights record remained poor and worsened in some areas. In the period leading up to the May national elections, campaigning was open and debates were televised. The Carter Center described this period as credible and commendable. However, in the period following the elections, authorities arbitrarily detained, beat, and killed opposition members, ethnic minorities, NGO workers, and members of the press. Authorities also imposed additional restrictions on civil liberties, including freedom of the press and freedom of assembly.

For documentation of some of the Ethiopian Army’s handiwork during its invasion of Somalia, taken from testimony from Human Rights Watch:

In the Ogaden, we have documented massive crimes by the Ethiopian army, including civilians targeted intentionally; villages burned to the ground as part of a campaign of collective punishment; public executions meant to terrify onlooking villagers; rampant sexual violence used as a tool of warfare; thousands of arbitrary arrests and widespread and sometimes deadly torture and beatings in military custody; a humanitarian and trade blockade on the entire conflict area; and hundreds of thousands of people forced away from their homes and driven to hunger and malnutrition.

He's right, democracy alone will not pull a country out of poverty. Good governance, however, does help. The Mo Ibrahim Good Governance Index rates Ethiopia 27 out of 48 states. I'd call that C work. Corruption is also important in the fight against poverty and the battle against Islamist terrorists, who prey on crooked governments. But the fight against corruption is not an exceptionally bright spot for the Zenawi regime, either. Transparency International ranks Ethiopia 138 out of 179 in its Corruption Perception Index.

One way to pull a country out of poverty is to make it a little easier to do business there. Ethiopia does rank well against other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but it remains in the bottom half of the "Ease of Doing Business" index when compared to the rest of the world.

Genocide and public opinion

Jim Hoagland, former foreign correspondent and now foreign affairs columnist for the Washington Post, wonders whether Kenya will join the ranks of other countries he once filed dispatches from in capital cities beset by destruction and war – Algiers, Tehran, Baghdad, Mogadishu, etc.

It is premature to compare Nairobi at this point to those other, more tumultuous capitals. But most of them -- as Nairobi certainly did -- originally had serious chances to succeed as workable or even important regional or international centers of governance, and they failed. Nairobi must now avoid their mistakes if it is to avoid their fate.

Hoagland makes the point that the global communications revolution may have connected people in visceral ways, but it has not been matched by “understanding of the Third World's dilemmas or a commitment to help resolve them.”

Unfortunately for aggrieved Kenyans, the nation's most serious troubles in its brief modern history arrive at a moment when international outrage is spread thin in Darfur, the Middle East, Iraq and elsewhere. The United Nations' unsuccessful struggle with Sudan to send into Darfur peacekeeping units that can protect themselves suggests that the once proudly proclaimed "duty to protect" abused citizens from their own governments is degenerating into something like the duty to scold.

Stop in the name of genocide
In a related matter, a story in the New York Times reflects on a far-reaching law adopted by the United Nations in 2005 to allow outside powers to intervene inside countries that are unwilling to stop genocide within their own borders. What some of the resolution’s original supporters claimed was a high-water mark for human rights around the globe has met certain cold realities on the ground. For one, the refusal of rich countries to deploy their well equipped militaries to hot zones like Darfur. Secondly, when troops finally do arrive, they are handcuffed by various roadblocks set up by host governments. (One aspect of this story that must be pointed out: its small sample size. This law has only been tested by the incidents surrounding the issues in Darfur.)

The resolution, nicknamed the “Right to Protect,” was something of a philosophical turning point for the United Nations, a body since its inception always upheld the rights of sovereign states. For proof, see the largely uninterrupted genocides by Hutu power groups in Rwanda, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the Derg in Ethiopia. For the first time, the “Right to Protect” meant that sovereignty could possibly take a back seat in favor of stopping unabated bloodshed and violence.

The role of the public
Piggybacking on a theme brought up by Hoagland: What is the public’s responsibility in stopping genocide? Donald Steinberg, director of the International Crisis Group’s New York office, was a special assistant for Africa in the Clinton administration during the Rwanda genocide. He points out that during the slaughter, the U.S. government debated whether to jamming the hate radio that whipped supporters to a froth and organized the génocidaires or reinforcing the UN mandate in the country.

“But each time some of us pushed for these steps,” he said, “others would ask, ‘Where’s the legal basis for these actions, where’s the public outcry, the ‘Hallelujah’ chorus of support? Where’s the evidence to show that these actions will end the killings?’ ”

It’s an important point. Without public outcry, few leaders will act boldly against killings where a country has limited interests. The festering bloodshed in former Zaire is a case in point. So is the 2006 Israeli bombing of Lebanon – a pretty clear account of a military targeting citizens – which went unchecked by the U.S., who simply sent ships to evacuate the thousands of Americans on vacation in the country and the Lebanese holding U.S. passports.

On one level, Darfur does seem different. A large coalition has been built to force governments to act on the bloodshed. The media certainly has provided (relatively) extensive coverage. Keeping people aware of the killings may have abated the violence, but it certainly has not stopped. Neither have the warring sides been forced to come to the table.

Has the PR campaign against Darfur tipped the balance towards rectifying the situation? It’s difficult to tell. The intransigence of the Sudanese government may come about from the greatest trump card of all: sovereignty, and the belief that the power of the nation state holds supreme. All governments understand it, and in response to external pressures stemming from the “interdependence” of globalization, desire it.

There’s something else at work here. The U.S. invasion of Iraq, whatever the political motives debated in the United States, is largely seen around the world as a unilateral imperialistic attack on a sovereign state. The story points out that 150 countries originally supported the resolution. Many of these countries hail from the third world, and they are presently shying away from the “Right to Protect” because they feel they could be the law could be enforced in their own backyard.

One could also argue that geo-politics plays a roll with Darfur. Many in the West look to China’s patronage of the Khartoum regime as a reason for the political stalemate in solving the problem. It’s more complicated than that. While Washington scolds the Sudanese concerning its government role in Darfur, the two countries enjoy a cozy relationship over the war on terror.

The debate over democracy and sovereignty remains unsettled. But there’s another matter at work here. The convictions of the person on the street. A dedicated clique attuned to the injustices in Darfur is one thing. What about the rest of us? Like Hoagland pointed out, the world at large displays a limited attention span. Issues like Darfur became significant when the public’s attention was already stretched by other issues: Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine.

I tend to take a more positive viewpoint of the campaign to keep Darfur in the media. Think of the counterfactual: What would be taking place there if the public awareness campaign was never hatched? An imperfect solution, yes; but it beats doing nothing.

The Kenya subtext
The subtext, of course, to both of these articles is as unmistakable as their timing. Kenya, a former stable country, is apparently on the verge of chaos. Regardless of the U.S. press’ swing-and-miss on the history of ethnicity and tribalism in the country, ethnic violence appears to be taking place. How far must this escalate before the world’s powers draw up a list of conditions before it contemplates intervention? Better yet, when do the t-shirts and bumper stickers get printed for “Stop the Killing in Kenya”?

Butterfly effect: Kenya, ethnicity and politics in Africa

Regardless of what our masthead says, we’ve come to focus most of our attention on West Africa. Africa, it seems, is the dream for the Attention Deficit Disorder-addled journalist. The continent is far too large, too diverse to attempt to skillfully cover the whole thing. And, let’s be honest: If all of Africa gets pretty short shrift in the English-speaking international press, West Africa proudly languishes on the bottom rung. It’s generally poorer than other regions; French-ier, too. What’s more: few game parks call the region home, and high-quality diving spots have never been its specialty.

So, it may be a bit out of our purview to speak about Kenya’s shameful elections and their violent aftermath. What interested me about the press coverage is that it has been the Americans – mostly the New York Times – that picked up on the ethnic card right away and ran with it. It’s not that the British or French have ignored the issue – ethnic fighting made headlines in Le Monde – but the European stories seem to concentrate primarily on political realities of the two parties and place ethnic tensions secondary. I am not saying either method is better than the other. It may just make light of the difference on how Americans (or U.S. newspapers) view Africa compared to Europeans.

I ♥ term limits
One discussion missing from the coverage – which has been very good, all things considered – is not about local ethnic and political issues, but grander themes affecting the whole continent. As more African countries tilt towards what most people abstractly call “democratic norms,” elections seem much more contested (and fairer) than a decade before. This may because of rising education levels or the growing influence on civil society (another buzz word). But no reform is most likely more important than the presidential term limits. First, term limits provide an easy litmus test on a president’s dedication to constitutionalism: any attempt to change the number of terms and you look like a villain (even if you succeed).

Second, term limits will eventually force presidents out of office, which relegates heads of state to a position at least somewhat subordinate to the needs of their political party. During the age of Africa’s Dinosaurs, it was the need (and power) of the President who trumped all party needs. That’s because the president most likely created the party to fulfill said needs. But even in nominally democratic Burkina Faso where Blaise Compaore has run his party, the CDP, like a personal fiefdom, younger members see the light at the end of the tunnel of his reign and are beginning to yearn to taste a little of the that wine themselves.

What term limits have helped usher in, then, feels like the beginning of a larger seismic shift to more (in general terms) of a Western Hemisphere version of politics. In the New World, by and large, the party machines triumph over personalities. Think of Mexico and the near seventy-year run of the PRI. Think of elections in places like El Salvador which were just smoke-and-mirror affairs where members of the oligarchy merely switched chairs. Think the generation-long Republican stranglehold on the Executive Branch in the United States and the corresponding Democratic iron grip on the Legislative Branch.

As democracies mature and civil institutions strengthen, it becomes imperative for parties who have enjoyed long periods in power to continue their grip on supremacy. Look at Kenya. If the opposition Orange Democratic Movement would come to power, not only would NARC lose the power of the purse, but investigations – studies into scandals and past sins – would spread like a khat bush after a nice long rain.

Those dastardly opposition leaders
There’s a sub-section to this argument. The long-suffering former opposition party leaders who finally reach the throne. Think Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal, where long-term whipping boys were either exiled or forced to show up at the airport come rain or shine and shake hands with every C-list dignitary bent on flying to Africa. Oh, these opposition leaders were given cursory powers, but they mostly were democratic window-dressing.

After humbly spending decades in shame as the ruling party dreamed up new ways to appropriate their reforms, steal their best politicians and beat them come election day, once these former minions got their chance at the throne, they weren’t going to let go. Think the rumors that Abdoulaye Wade grooming his son for power. Think of the (xenophobic?) shenanigans Laurent Gbagbo has stirred up to continue power in Cote d’Ivoire.

Part of the problem is age. Just because opposition leaders fought Africa’s dinosaurs tooth and nail doesn’t mean they were any more committed to democracy than the presidents-for-life. It’s an argument that says a new Africa would benefit from a whole a new generation of politicians, especially in politically ill countries like Zimbabwe. (On a random note, age is one factor why some people support Barack Obama in the United States.)

In a continent full of political realists, the average African doesn’t have to look far to find fault with Kenya’s election. How can voters oust half the ruling party’s cabinet and still bring back the president to power? (One Kenyan opposition leader told the New York Times: “We live in Kenya. We are Kenyans. We know what is happening.”)

Fool us once – shame on you
One of the underlying factors of the opposition’s fury may stem from what they saw on television – in Nigeria. It was during 2007’s other major election in Anglophone Africa where a ruling party acknowledged it helped swing the vote for its candidate in a tainted election. While opposition parties cried foul, a few days of protests – some of them quite violent – eventually fizzled out and the president remains sitting, although with circumscribed powers.

Word travels fast in these parts. Kenyans most likely learned a lot from the precedent of still-born democracy in Nigeria. Kenyans came to understand how far a ruling party can bend the law, install their choice in the Presidential Palace and then make nice and promise never to do it again – all in the name of Democracy. Once that lesson was understood – and most likely a few others – the anger Kenyans possessed towards their own sham election spread like fire. Of course history and local realities play a big role. But this is also a larger African issue. Presidents and heads of state often get together to talk over issues of the day – and most likely trade notes. We can’t underestimate the fact that African citizens fully understand that criminal politics that go down in one country could easily produce a butterfly effect elsewhere.