A few things you need to know about Omar Bongo

Was this photo really worth $9 million? Photo courtesy of White House.

A few things you need to know about Omar Bongo of Gabon.

• He is the world’s longest ruling leader (who is not a monarch), recently celebrating his fourth decade in power, outlasting everyone from Charles de Gaulle to Jacques Chirac.
• He likes his name. Take for example the Omar Bongo Triumphal Boulevard, the Senate Palace Omar Bongo.
• He is a political genius, says a political science professor at Omar Bongo University.
• His rule coincided with Gabon’s rise to becoming Africa’s third largest oil exporter.
• “Bongo’s rule has been a masterclass in the use of patronage,” says the Guardian. Even African diplomats are impressed. Petrodollars props up the bloated civil service. Important opposition leaders, the Guardian says, are either paid off or brought into the government. One member of the opposition, head of the Bongo Must Go Party, says with its relatively small population and bountiful resources, Gabon should be more like Dubai.
• Bongo likes to keep it in the family. His son, and probable heir apparent, is the country’s minister of defense. His daughter remains the head of the cabinet. Her husband is the minister of finance.
• He likes houses. French prosecutors discovered the family owned 33 houses in France alone. His wife, originally the daughter of Congo’s president Denis Sassou-Nguesso, was featured on the U.S.-based reality show Really Rich Real Estate, scouring southern California for a $25 million mansion.
• Rumors have long swirled that he has accepted millions of Euros in kickbacks from the French oil firm ELF.
• For all these riches, nearly two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line. Gabon has fewer miles of paved roads than oil pipelines. The country does excel at cutting down trees: Since 1957, two-thirds of its forests have been logged, yet the government is planning to set aside 10 percent of its land mass for national parks.
• He really wanted to meet George Bush. So much, in fact, Bongo allegedly paid disgraced Republican lobbyist Jack Abramoff $9 million to meet with the President of the United States.

In Mauritania, the future's so bright, they gotta wear shades?

Mauritania’s first democratically elected civilian president in nearly five decades, Sidi Mohamed Abdallahi Ould Cheikh, recently celebrated his first year in office. IRIN has an interesting piece on the changes he’s brought to the country and the obstacles he faces.

He has allowed long-banned political and religious associations, a very popular move. Islamist-leaning parties like Tawassoul and the Rally for National Reform and Development are now well established.

Cheikh campaigned for the post on a pledge to end slavery in the country, and signed that into law less than nine months ago. While it’s immediately hard to tackle such an institutional problem, at least one human rights campaigner gives him props for trying. Another bonus is thelong-standing issue of nearly 20,000 Mauritanian refugees living in Senegal has also begun to be seriously addressed.

His more limited success has come in the battle against corruption and modernizing the public sector. All this happens with the backdrop of Mauritania’s 2001 discovery of large oil deposits, which has yet to really pay off. The government recently estimated the unemployment rate to hover around 32 percent. Things are made worse by the world’s rising food prices, especially in light that sandy, dry and hot Mauritania can only grow 30 percent of the food stocks necessary to feed the population.

Adding more economic pressure to the country is what the Western media perceives as a growing terrorist threat, especially after four French tourists were killed and another wounded on Christmas eve by members of an Al-Qaeda linked terror group. The killings led to the cancellation of the Paris-Dakar rally, usually an economic boom for the country. In early February, gunmen attacked the Israeli embassy in Nouckchott, wounding three people. The tourism industry continues to suffer from the fallout of these attacks.

Another pressing issue is the pan-West African problem of drug smugglers using the long, deserted West African coastline as a port to transfer drugs to Europe. If smugglers, who rely on corrupt military and government officials, become entrenched in the country, it could lead to instability and lawlessness.

UN Report on the security situation in Cote d’Ivoire

From Secretary-General, dated April 15.

The good news is the overall security situation stable, along with the country’s budding political atmosphere. However, the report raises worries about the disarmament about the northern-based Forces Nouvelles and militias in the western part of the country. Violent crime remains a concern, especially armed robberies.

In the political arena, the opposition party Rassemblement des republicans held its convention in Abidjan and named Allassane Dramane Ouattara as the party’s candidate for the presidential election scheduled for November 30. The ruling Front populaire ivorien held a rally in the former rebel capital Bouake.

Prime Minister Guillaume Soro attended a Women’s Day celebration in President Laurent Gbagbo’s hometown, and claimed the northern-based prime minister has a good working relationship with the president.

Civil society groups still clamor to be included in the Ouagadougou Agreement. Burkinabé president Blaise Compaore expressed desire to hold a national meeting with such groups.

Regarding the sticky issue of voting rights, more than 110 mobile courts have been dispatched throughout the country to issue duplicate birth certificates to any Ivorian over the age of 18 and not part of the previous census. By April 8, the courts had issued more than 565,000 certificates. They hope to finish by the end of the month.

While the legal framework for the electoral process has not been finalized, its budget has: $83 million, which the Ivorian government will chip in $18 and the European Union, Japan and Korea will provide $25. This currently leaves $40 million unaccounted for. (Any takers?)

The International Crisis Group is a little less sanguine about the political situation. In a recent report, the group points out that in the presidential election certain candidates may be willing to go to extremes, reigniting a potentially explosive environment.

The report also claims implementation has been shaky of many of the Ouagadougou Accords that brought a halt to the civil war. Importantly, they claim voter identification has not completely determined who is a citizen and who may vote. However, the largest worries go to all major political parties sticking to the Ouagadougou Accords and insuring the election is carried out in a transparent manner, with proper identification for all registered voters and a security situation that allows people to vote in peace.

Wade: hear no evil, see no evil

From AfricAsia:

Senegal's President Abdoulaye Wade said Monday there was neither famine nor hunger riots in the west African country, blaming a recent rally on opposition groups.

"There is no famine in Senegal. There are no hunger riots in Senegal," Wade said while inaugurating an agricultural project in this village 80 kilometers (50 miles) south of Dakar.

Wade's comments followed an article in the French daily Le Parisien, widely commented upon in Senegal's private media, about the rise in food prices in Senegal and a March 30 rally against them.

Police cracked down hard on the rally, banned by the authorities, using batons and teargas and arresting some two dozen people.

Wade blamed the rally on opposition groups looking to gain attention and journalists seeking "sensation."

The Senegalese government has moved to soften the blow of rising food prices, which it blames on cost increases in the international market, by cutting taxes and increasing subsidies on staples.

Reason #522 why African leaders remain quiet in face of tragedy in Zimbabwe

Short answer: I could say that most African leaders are cowards, but let's continue anyway for the sake of argument. It’s about sovereignty, stupid.

This brings up a different facet of this morning’s debate on self determination and power in the era of genocide. We’ll get to what I think is the overall issue in a second. First, southern African states and Zimbabwe:

From Stephanie Hanson at the Council on Foreign Relations:

Even in South Africa, where President Thabo Mbeki’s policy of quiet diplomacy toward Zimbabwe has been widely criticized, change seems to be afoot. Ahead of the SADC meeting, the head of South Africa’s ruling ANC party and current presidential front-runner, Jacob Zuma, spoke out against the delay in releasing Zimbabwe’s election results. Mbeki, by contrast, said there was “no crisis” (Times-SA) in Zimbabwe. While Zuma did not attend the SADC meeting, the region views him as South Africa’s “de facto leader,” says Sydney Masamvu of the International Crisis Group. Yet it’s unclear if these shifts will have any effect over Mugabe—who refused to take phone calls (Thomson Financial) from African Union leaders last week and didn’t even attend the SADC meeting.

Experts say one reason African leaders remain quiet in the face of regional turmoil is their strict interpretation of the concept of sovereignty. The African Union enshrines the principles of sovereignty and noninterference in the affairs of another state in its charter, which some analysts say has discouraged even soft, diplomatic initiatives to respond to crises. This makes it an ineffective body, writes Quentin Wray, a leading South African columnist. The African Union, he says, repeatedly sends the message, “if you are unlucky enough to live under tyranny you’re on your own.” An op-ed on Uganda’s New Vision website suggests the body reconsider its stance on sovereignty, calling it “a major contributing factor to the suffering of Africans.” At the same time, monitors like the International Crisis Group say the African Union played a positive role in resolving the Kenya crisis earlier this year.

Some experts suggest Africa’s leaders also find it useful to turn a blind eye to the misdeeds of others. That way, writes Joshua Kurlantzick in the New Republic, they can insulate themselves from criticism, too. Other analysts worry the African Union’s failure to act on Zimbabwe might embolden other leaders to mimic Mugabe’s behavior. With elections on the horizon in Ghana, Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea, the precedent of Zimbabwe is cause for concern.

Call the question, Mr. Roberts
The question I pose: In the face of a withering nation-state, must African leaders cling to supra-sovereignty no matter how badly it reflects upon them? First, I don’t think the nation-state is going away, but it has felt some blows, whether real or perceived; this is especially true in Africa.

Take globalization, for instance. The rise of capitalism over the past few centuries has been inextricably linked to the development of the nation state. But what happens when capitalism “breaks away from its national moorings”? The state, Noelle Burgi and Philip S. Golub argue in Le Monde Diplomatique, is reduced to becoming merely a caretaker – not mucking things up for the post-national companies doing business within its boundaries. Some would argue that is why the Europeans are slowly shifting their idea of sovereignty upwards to a more a multi-national conglomeration.

Things are different in Africa. For one, African governments – for a host of reasons – feel much weaker and less legitimate than their European counterparts. (Note African worries over multi-party democracy.) Even the most bullying state leaders feel at the beck and call of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The World Health Organization and UNDP are often very involved in governmental affairs; so are numerous NGOs, who make important policy decisions in some countries. Foreign investment may be miniscule throughout most of Africa, but it is growing, putting more power in the hands of outsiders. Let’s not forget political and financial arm twisting by super foreign powers like the United States, or in this neck of the woods, France.

It is no wonder then why one can hear whispers of further African integration, either through regional bodies like ECOWAS or a continent-wide organ like the African Union. Although many may scoff at the practicality of a United States of Africa, a more relaxed policy of overseeing the needs of regional trade and cross-border issues like the environment, immigration, traffic, food and agriculture has already taken hold on many levels.

For all the perceived slights against them, African leaders still hold a lot of power. If they have to wag it to remind the world every once in a while, so be it. (It’s one reason they stand behind Mugabe, who has already beat the colonists once.) Africans will also point out that it was less than 125 years ago that the continent’s was carved up virtually tabula rasa, and its borders officially ratified just four decades ago. The fight for independence took a long time; leaders are not easily going to give that up, no matter what obstacles they face.

Hold on to your hats: Strikes considered in Guinea

From IRIN, with a new fresh page design, replete with maps (go check it out):

Guinea’s powerful trade union groups are considering whether to go ahead with a general strike at the end of March and risk a government crackdown, like the ones that occurred in January and February 2007 which led to the deaths of up to 200 civilians.

“We are continuing consultations for a successful outcome of the crisis,” said Raibatou Serah Diallo, the secretary general of the National Confederation of Guinean Workers.

Unionists last threatened to strike in January 2008, claiming President Lansana Conté was breaking the power-sharing agreement that brought an end to last year’s violence.

Guineans have endured four union-led strikes in last 15 months to protest high food prices, worsening living conditions, corruption and President Conté’s leadership.

The groups – tell me if you’ve heard this before – are upset about the slow pace of reforms in the country and the stalled investigations regarding 2007’s violence against civilians and “more information on the misappropriation of public funds.”

As in January, however, it appears at least some of the government is willing to delay a strike through negotiations.

Our man in N’djamena: Idriss Deby's human rights folly

Last time we checked, Chadian President Idriss Deby was still in power and rounding up opposition politicians. So what’s up today? Eight weeks after an insurgent army battled government forces inside the capital city, nearly toppling the Deby government, our man in N’djamena remains in power while opposition politicians remain in jail.

According to the Chadian group Human Rights Without Borders, at least 20 people have been detained but have not been publicly charged with any crime. This number may be artificially low because much of the country’s political opposition, members of civil society and independent journalists have fled the country in fear of reprisals by the government.

“Certainly the authorities were aggressive before the rebel attack in February,” Deuzoumbe Daniel Passalet of Human Rights Without Borders told IRIN. “But after February they became vengeful. Anyone who was suspected of supporting the rebels was arrested and sometimes their houses were demolished.”

“I fled the country after police came to my house to try to arrest me,” he added.

Less than two weeks after French troops helped push the rebels out of the capital city, the Chadian government declared a state of emergency, granting the federal government to control the media, provincial governors the power to restrict movement and security forces the power to arrest and detain people without charge. The emergency was lifted March 15, but eight people remain unaccounted for, according to a report from Human Rights Watch.

The New York-based human rights organization found that at a majority of the 15 prisoners originally detained under the emergency guidelines are members of the Goran ethnic group, which allegedly predominate the rebel group that recently attacked the capital city. It wasn’t the first time the Deby administration has targeted a specific ethnic group after an attempted insurgency, Human Rights Watch maintained. In 2007, members of the Tama group were “subject to arbitrary arrest and detention by government security forces” after a failed takeover attempt by a group that consisted mainly of members of the same group.

Mahamoud Adoum Aguid, the country’s former top customs official has been detained since Febraury 19. His whereabouts remains unknown. Ngarlejy Yorongar and Lol Mahamat Choua, two opposition politicians detained by police, have been released. However, the whereabouts of opposition member Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh remains unknown.

Human Rights Watch also documented the torture of at least one prisoner at the hands of security forces. Two others are thought to have been abused, the group said.

Liberian census gets underway

Today, the Liberian government will begin its first census of the country in more than a quarter century. It's an effort to better serve the population, government leaders say. "Without data, there is no way to target your resources properly," Edward Liberty, who heads the agency charged with carrying out the census, told the Associated Press.

From that story:

For more than a year, over 9,000 census-takers have combed the densely forested nation mapping every structure. For three days starting Friday, they will revisit each dwelling and count the inhabitants.

The preparations, including the marking of dwellings, have given birth to rumors. Some wonder if its part of a military recruitment drive, a potent fear in a country where boys as young as 5 were handed machine guns and forced to fight. Others believe it's in preparation for new taxes.

To try to dispel these and other rumors, the government commissioned a pop star to compose a catchy tune about the census. It's been translated into Liberia's 16 languages and is playing daily on the radio, urging Liberians to "stand up and be counted."

Throughout the country's interior, billboards have been erected reminding villagers to stay home for three days starting Friday to properly be counted. Schools are closed through the end of the census.

As Ghana mulls purchasing presidential jet, priorities are questioned

Debate has broken out in Ghana over a proposal to purchase a $37 million 12-seat aircraft that will serve as a presidential jet. As with any (minor) political scandal, it's not so much about the jet, but a question of priorities.

From writer Godwin Yaw Agboka in Accra’s Public Agenda.

When a JOY FM reporter allegedly asked [Press Secretary Mr. Andrew] Awuni why the country would spend over $20 million to celebrate Ghana@50, $60 million to build a presidential palace, and now $37 million on a presidential jet, he asked the reporter: "how will you explain to Ghanaians that we are spending $600 million building the Bui Dam when we don't have water?" He added that Ghanaians should move away, from what he termed, the 'poverty mentality.' He argued further that if Ghanaians questioned the purchase of the jet, "then we should stop building the roads, because we don't have water, we should stop building the Bui Dam because we don't have water." "Is that what we are saying?" was his rhetorical question.

Such answers from Mr. Awuni made me want to puke! In fact, his demeanor and unbridled, headstrong approach to responding to the reporter's questions just reminded me of the last days of the NDC, when the likes of Dr. Tony Aidoo and some individuals within the NDC had become so arrogant and near larger-than-life, until Ghanaians proved to them that they did not send themselves to power. It was Ghanaians that did! Who does Mr. Awuni think he is addressing, here? Some uneducated Ghanaians? Some people who have lost touch with what is happening lately in the country? Some unwavering loyalists, who will keep mute even when they are starving to death?

The problem is not about the purchase of a Presidential Jet or building a Presidential Palace. I believe every well-meaning Ghanaian would love to see the President live in a structure and an environment that befit his status as the President of the Republic of Ghana. After all, he is the one who has spearheaded all these many debt-relief processes for the country, in addition to doing some wonderful work on the economy that has seen so much macro-economic stability, since his government took over. It will be ridiculous for anyone to think that the safety of the President is no one's concern, especially so when the jet would serve the interests of future presidents.

The questions hinge on priority and timing. What baffles me about this decision and the passion with which government officials are moving from media house to media house defending this decision is the blind eye they have turned to the basic needs that most Ghanaians are struggling, daily to access. The last time I heard Ghana had only one Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) equipment for undertaking scans, and even when a player of the senior national team needed an MRI done on him, during the just-ended African Nation's Cup, he had to be sent to Nigeria. Just recently, the new CEO of the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital was crying badly for some equipment that needed replacement at the hospital. How does Mr. Awuni justify the need for a Presidential Jet-and arrogantly so-when materials and equipment needed in our nation's hospitals, that will benefit the majority of Ghanaians are ignored?

Decentralize this: If one takes away power from the federal government, where does it go?

“Decentralization is moving in full swing in Ghana,” writes journalist and researcher Kofi Akosah-Sarpong in the Accra Mail (via AllAfrica.com). “The practice, as a development venture, is to broaden the provision of public goods nation-wide by involving the citizenry in their progress.”

People have long talked about decentralization in Africa in many different government sectors: education, politics, budgeting and health. There are those who claim that Africa’s very centralized states are remnants from colonial times, where European powers had to build a formidable authority through government structures so a few people could rule over vast territory. Some will argue that these powerful federal systems felt right to the newly independent African leaders because pre-colonial Africa was mostly ruled by Kings and traditional leaders with near absolute power. I say that’s a bit of an oversimplification.

But let’s stay with generalizations, anyway. After Africa’s first generation of leaders was overthrown by military juntas, this new generation of dictators cultivated and maintained these highly centralized states. Centralization requires building a vast bureaucracy, making sure that power flows only from the capital to the provinces. But it also hands some power over to those little people who run the levers of this grand machine: the civil servants. Once the machine is embedded with this influence, it is hard to put a stop to it.

How it works elsewhere
Speaking to someone fluent in the health system in Burkina, centralization means keeping the power of budget allocation in Ouagadougou. When the little village health centers come up with their budget, they must first send it to the district level where it is weighed upon and then incorporated into the grander project. This is then sent up to the regional level, where its merits are again debated upon. Finally, it is sent to the national level, where people then decide where to dole out funds.

Staffing is another centralized activity. Unlike teachers, who can work around the country provided they understand different grade levels, health workers have developed different specialties depending on the region they work. Those in the south may understand river blindness, while those in the north may deal more with guinea worm (or whatever). However, these areas of expertise may prove irrelevant when a minister in Ouagadougou transfers the southern health professional to work in the far north.

There has been much chatter about decentralizing many government sectors, but my people claim it is still mostly talk. Centralization means the government holds a lot of cards, and it’s very hard for a bureaucracy to willingly pass this power down the line. In a more philosophical, political economy bent, what does this centralized system do to a government’s legitimacy for those at the local level? Is the government seen as a blind tyrant or a benevolent all-powerful force? Another question I’ve always had: What do local people think about their politically neutered local leaders? I understand even local préfets (governors) enjoy a bit of power (I’ve seen one put people in jail and another hold a lot of responsibility for a very important government project), but how much authority do they really have?

The Ghana plan
Let’s get back to Akosah-Sarpong’s piece about Ghana, where it appears decentralization will play into an election issue. If I get him correctly, unlike the bread-and-butter argument for political decentralization in Burkina Faso, Akosah-Sarpong favors using decentralization as a way to increase power not to politically created departments, but to the more historical (and cultural) districts and groups.

Though decentralization may be part of the emerging global development architecture, it is how it is implemented that differs from one local to another. This is informed by the local's history and culture, as the World Bank and other experts argue. That makes Ghana and the African region peculiar, for it is the only region where its development processes are dominated by foreign development paradigms to the detriment of its traditional values and histories. And the peculiarity tells the development troubles of Ghana.

Part of the solution is decentralization, as a way of involving the people in their development process by understanding their needs that are seen in their values based on their history and culture. But because of Ghana's colonial heritage and its peoples' culture much of the work of the decentralization process wheel around the mixing of Ghana's traditional values with those of its ex-colonial Western orthodox ones. The global development design is replete with this…

But this is where much of the challenges will come in a Ghana where policy-making and bureaucratization, for the past 51 years, despite its history and rich culture, has been one-track - more ex-colonial neo-liberal Western paradigms running the development show to the detriment of Ghana's traditional values.

Kufour is aware of this and reveals that the decentralization "transformation would require a new type of assembly members to comprehend both local and native issues that could give leadership and direction to the staff of the local government service in the district." And that may mean reading from the locals and mixing them with the global prosperity construction.

Political age limits: How old is too old to serve?

Now that Kenya’s political leaders found a political solution to the post-election crisis, Robert Chutha would like to see political backing for an age limit for presidential and parliamentary candidates.

Writing in the Daily Nation from Nairobi.

As constitutional amendments become the focus in the near future, Kenya should definitely borrow a leaf from Benin, whose constitution sets the age limit for presidential candidates at 70. I would strongly recommend that 65 years be the age limit for both presidential and parliamentary candidates in Kenya.

The retirement age for civil servants is 55 years. If we give our presidents and MPs 10 more years, it is only fair that they quickly achieve their goals for the country, then gracefully bow out and go home to take care of their own affairs.

…There is life after presidency. Retirement of a president does not mean that he goes home to herd goats, though that is an option for the willing.

Let our ageing leaders realise that they have a role to play in advocacy on the very grave issues facing Africa today, including HIV and Aids, conflict mediation and peace-building.

Good luck. It’s an interesting point and an much needed debate. People around the world are living longer and enjoying healthier retirement years. There are people who will always argue that experience trumps youthfulness and energy in politics (although I am not so sure, myself).

Look at the United States. There you have John McCain, the presumptive Republican nominee for president, who will be 72 years old in August. Robert Byrd, in the U.S. Senate since January 1959, is currently 90. Strom Thurmond served in the same body until he was 100 before retiring in 2002. (He died a few months later.) In the House of Representatives since 1980, Ralph Hall from Texas is now 85.

Of course, African politics are different than the States. On the continent, a lot of long-time rulers are now entering their second decade in power, and those people are no longer spring chickens. In Burkina Faso, rumors are currently circulating that President Blaise Compoare (in power since 1987) is ill with prostate problems. The question that raises, of course, is if he is sick, how well can he manage the complicated affairs of the state. (It’s a credible question to an aging John McCain in the U.S. as it was to the ill Fidel Castro in Cuba.)

I personally like the idea of African emeritus leaders playing a role in many different issues. Maybe I am naïve, but even the most power hungry of ruler, wherever his/her provenance, has some desire to serve country or continent. Africa’s retired elite could begin working on solving conflicts and providing a source of inspiration for the future. It reminds of the Paul Theroux tale where an old friend who is a government minister in Malawi (I think) begged Theroux to send his children to Africa to help build the continent while his own children are mostly educated in the West, where they now live and work. Warning, unbridled sanctimoniousness ahead: At some point, it’s time to give back.

I would say if presidents can respect constitutional term limits, they can serve well in their senior years, providing they remain healthy and alert. But, those attempting to make constitutional changes to increase the number of term limits should be booted out the door, no matter what age they are.

Protests and power in Burkina Faso

“What am I going to do now?” is a common question asked by Burkinbé in times of trouble. Perhaps their child needs medicine. Perhaps they’ve been laid off. Perhaps they lost their moped to an accident. You wouldn’t think it was because vandals broke into their store and destroyed anything they couldn’t walk away with.

Such as the reality of the protests against skyrocketing prices that gripped the country in the past two weeks or so. As was pointed out in the fortnightly L’Evenement of Ouagadougou, what was to be a peaceful rally against government inaction against the ever-increasing grocery bills, turned violent and ugly in Bobo-Dioulasso, where demonstrators attacked what they considered symbols of power: gas stations, the mayor’s office and shops who remained opened past their designated closing time in accordance to the rules of the “dead ville.”

As a matter of fact, the mandatory closings weren’t well organized that morning (February 20) in Bobo, and it took a rumor that two children had been killed in a melee with the police sweeping through town to inflame passions and literally ignite the peripheral quartiers of the city. In some places, the paper says, the few policemen around were literally overrun by the demonstrators. When the police presence was stronger, demonstrators evaded them. By the time the authorities caught up to demonstrators, it was too late: the damage had been done; everything had been destroyed.

Which opposition movement?
What it seems, at least to me, is that the once fractured opposition in Burkina Faso, which has played bystanders to the country’s political process, has morphed into a second, more radical front: Les Jeunes Patriotes, created by former Blaise Compoare supporter Nana Thibuat. From his new perch, Thibaut ridicules the opposition for their cowardice and lack of an action plan to combat these rising prices.

For its part, the opposition claims that while it can complain about the fact the government is being run by outside forces – code words for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund – it does not actually govern, rendering its power pretty much moot. The few parties in parliament have slowly tried to gain power through the ballot box, Thibaut and his people have categorically decided to take power on the streets, mostly in messy ways. Read any summary of the demonstrations and you’ll learn of the high number of very young participants.

The important thing to understand is that the Jeunes Patriotes could be is a watershed, and potentially destabilizing, event in Burkina Faso. Whatever one thinks about the opposition here, they are mainly constitutionalists, dedicated to working through the political system to tie down some of Blaise Compoare’s power while providing a reliable political alternative to people. However, it appears that people ransacking shops and generally wreaking havoc are most likely not happy on the pace of change. Burkina’s opposition has always been accused of not paying enough attention to the pleas of regular people.

If these Jeunes Patriotes begin exercising more power – and less restraint – what would happen to the political dynamic? Would parts of society become more radicalized and begin demanding a fair share of the goods and power? Remember, one argument against massive change in Africa (if I may generalize) is that Africans themselves are too meek (or whatever) to make demands on their governments.

• “The power is going to be out for the next three days,” says the power company. (A reality here right now.) OK, thanks for letting us know. We’ll still be paying our bills.
• “I am tired. You have to come back tomorrow to get your ID card.” OK, what time, sir?
• “I want to change the constitution to run for a third term!” Well, I guess that’s sounds like a fine idea, Mr. President.

These are exaggerations, of course. But you get the point.

Les Jeunes Patriotes and you
For Thibaut using the term “Jeunes Patriotes” is very interesting. It was a term that last cropped up in Abidjan, headed by Charles Blé Goudé, an Ivorian who once fought for political control of the Cote d’Ivoire’s largest university (U of Cocody in Aibjdan) against northern political leader, and present Ivorian Prime Minister, Guillame Soro. Goudé and his Patriotes militants were a shady vigilante group that helped police run checkpoints near government buildings, fought against French troops in an October 2004 scuffle, rallied the masses at pro-government political rallies held in soccer stadiums that resembled rap concerts. They were mostly known for harassing and killing foreigners (including many Burkinabé) and were later implicated in numerous human rights violations and disappearances that Goudé had an UN-imposed travel ban imposed on him. He most likely took the group’s members from the mostly throwaway kids who ended up in Abidjan with some education, but without steady work and very diminishing possibilities for the future. Their anger stemmed from the fact that for generations the country had provided for not only Ivorians, but millions of foreigners who flocked their. Now, the parade had ended. Finally, they were most likely secretly funded by Simone Gbagbo, wife of (formally?) ultra-nationalist President of Cote d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo.

It’s a questionable decision for Burkinabé to use this term, but it most likely serves its purpose to those on the streets: We are not above taking the law into our hands. The Ivorian Jeunes Patriotes grew out of need to protect themselves during chaos and malaise that characterized Cote d’Ivoire. What would a similarly named operation say about Burkinabé politics?

To that question, my first impulse would be to say radicalization and balkanization, however miniscule, of society. It became somewhat apparent (if you squint) after the city calmed down that Burkina Faso’s slowly growing middle class is perceived to be the enemy of these angry masses. Perhaps it’s because those few members of the middle are not only viewed as possessing more (money, power, etc.) than those manning the barricades, but they are perceived to be more vulnerable than those enjoying real political power. (The second part may be more important than the first: People are mad, but they know they can’t strike back at those holding power.)

A moped gap?
A friend of mine had a theory that anyone in Ouagadougou who drove a moped should be described as middle class. Owning a moto means that one can afford such a purchase, which runs at least $700. A moto translates into freedom of movement. It allows people to live in one area of town and work in another (an important feature in Ouagadougou, the Houston of the Sahel.) You can visit family and friends with a moto. Mopeds are used for moving goods, also. It takes money to make money, the cliché goes, and a moto is the perfect starter kit.

Those out in the streets during the protests most likely don’t own many motos. I know many members of the informal sector, and very, very few of them have access to motorized transport. Informal workers can never earn bank credit, keeping the purchase out of reach. (Most salaried Burkinabés are in for at least one or two loans for different items like schools and motos and house expansions. They get under this because there future is secure because it’s very difficult to fire a salaried worker.)

Most people work, however, in the informal sector. Life may not be so financially secure, but these people for years had devised ways of getting by on very limited funds. Their plans also go awry when an emergency comes around, like the aforementioned health issue or the result of a crime (a major factor why most Burkinabé support vigilante justice.) Last year’s price increases appeared to create more of a migraine than anything else. This year, with prices still rising, most people rang the bell on emergency.

Full speed to the riot, captain
Let’s go back to the reasons for the riots, then. There’s the age-old debate that revolutions actually start when times are good and economic opportunities are growing. Perhaps this small period of destabilization in Burkina is due to that. For some people, life is definitely getting better. The economy is growing; business is up; people are building houses and large buildings in every corner of town; the number of fancy new cars on the streets is unbelievable.

But those at the bottom rungs can only watch this go by, like the shiny cars and their mocking passengers Nana Thibuat talked about last week. When those on the bottom see their future evaporate while that jerk night door is clearly doing better, perhaps it is time to do something.

Part of the problems here may be the country’s stunted political culture. Burkina Faso’s riots were overshadowed by the more violent and larger demonstrations in Cameroon. However, at least one political scientist pointed out a number of similarities between the two countries: They are both French colonies with long-serving rulers who each have a distaste for truly participative government; they have been mostly stable in a sea of relative chaos; each are facing concerns that the government is out of touch with the problems of everyday people.

Most likely underlying Cameroon’s anger is that fact that President Paul Biya, in power since Ronal Reagan was calling the contras of Nicaragua “freedom fighters,” has proposed changing the constitution to provide him a third term. Blaise Compaore, who just celebrated his 20^th anniversary in power, won’t have to make that decision for awhile as he’s been given one more chance to run for a five-year term, in 2010. People in Cameroon read the writing on the wall. What about those in Burkina?

Here is the list of complaints against the country and the government that arose after the demonstrations. The reasons were long and telling, not only for their breadth but also their depth.

Of course, you can’t ignore the high prices around the world in 2007 and the skyrocketing prices of 2008, which affect everybody, but disproportionally concerns those on the bottom rung. Without dear prices (as the Economist would say), nobody takes to the streets for anything other than celebrating a wedding.

Here are some others:

• Overreach of the police and military in their tactics against protesters;
• The adoption of a market economy during the creation of a new constitution in 1991;
• Bad governance, which wastes human and financial resources;
• The feeble political opposition and civil society to bring these issues into check;
• Trust between citizens and government institutions have eroded;
• The World Bank and IMF make most political decisions;
• Privatization programs have lead to layoffs;
• Stagnation of salaries;
• The government only cares about the noveau riche.

It’s an incomplete list, of course. One thing to worry about here is overreacting, says the guy who has already penned 1,700 melodramatic words. Since I’ve lived in Burkina Faso, Ouaga and Bobo and other cities have witnessed demonstrations about every year, year-and-a-half. It’s part of the process in a country where politics are so opaque: Maybe demonstrators do it to let some steam out; maybe to settle some scores; maybe for valid political reasons. There’s always a lot of head scratching in the press afterward, and maybe the government makes some deals with the unions, but the anger always seems to dissipate. (Of course, maybe I don’t know where the anger goes.) Things return to calm for a long while, and then the place inexplicably blows up again.

Perhaps we’ll return to that period of calm. But, there’s more than a few indicators to say this unease may remain: Worldwide food and oil prices are certainly out of the government’s control, and they’ll be high for at least the next few months. This will continue to exert pressure on everybody. In the end, it’s up to Burkina’s government to provide at least a little bit of support for those willing to take to the streets. You have to wonder, though, how much of a rock and hard place are these ministers between?

Mali begins to re-evaluate, fix its democratic model

Mali’s President Amadou Toumani Touré recently appointed a 15-person task force to investigate the state of the country’s democracy. The underlying motivation of the group will be to evaluate and strengthen the country’s democratic model, which means making changes.

According to a story by the Nation (of Nairobi), the task force will be addressing the issues of electoral fraud, low citizen participation, how to fund political parties, voter registration and education. It should be noted that Toumani Touré, known as ATT, ended the one party after toppling the government of Moussa Traoré in 1991. Elections were called in 1992, but ATT did not take part. Since then, the country has seen 3 other presidential and parliamentary elections, where two incumbents have handed over power to a successor. Toumani Touré retired from the military and returned to politics in 2002, running for president (and winning) as an independent. He won a second (and final) term in 2007.

Mali has long been considered one of the most politically stable, democratically progressive countries in West Africa. It currently enjoys a ranking of 20 out of 45 states in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, compiling such indicators as rule of law, citizen participation, human rights and sustainable economic opportunity.

From the Nation:

The decision comes at a time when Mali itself is not facing any trouble, nor heading to any immediate election which could have been a source of suspicion or tension.

Across Africa, the democratic achievements of the early and mid 90s - which have generalised the practice of multi-party politics and regular elections in several countries - are being seriously questioned by some and challenged by the facts.

In Mali, "the institutional practices of the past 15 years have shown a certain number of flaws and shortcomings which constitute matters of concern for the political class as well as for the civil society organisations", President Touré said when addressing the newly formed 15-member committee, headed by Mr [Former minister Daba] Diawara and comprising lawyers, university professors and civil society leaders.

The Malian ruler also noted that despite "the many amendments to the electoral Act and the Political parties Charter', the electoral process and financing the political parties" remain problematic in his country, as has been shown by the different polls organised since 1992, when the country entered the democratic era under the leadership of ATT.

… "We need to launch an in-depth debate on those issues", Mr Ousmane Issoufi Maïga who was the then Prime Minister said over the July 2007 parliamentary elections. He expressed the wish that "all sections" of the country needed to be consulted to see what was wrong with Mali's democracy. For the former prime minister, "it was important for the youth, the women, the political parties, the civil society organisations, opinion leaders, for everybody to meet to address these issues".

Warning: Another Governance Index: Failed and Weak states

Quick question: What’s the most global buzzword from the post-Sept. 11 world? The term “Patriot”? No, that doesn’t have much traction outside of the White House. What about “no blood for oil”? Maybe, but I don’t think many people in poorer states have the desire to paint large banners and march around with them. I’ll give you a hint: it has something to do with the nexus of poverty and efficacy of government institutions. If you guess “failed or weak states,” you’re right.

These are the countries with weak and very opaque governance structures; leaders with an obsession with state security coupled with a certain ambivalence to personal security; and, a government’s inability (for whatever reasons) to meet the basic needs of its citizens. In shorthand, as the Center for Global Development points out, failed (or weak) states are encumbered with little or no capacity, a lack of legitimacy and some serious security concerns. (Say that three times.)

However you stir it, it all adds up to a pretty messy chowder. Those in the know have blamed failed states for causing a lot of ruckus in the world. Afghanistan was a failed state for years until it was “civilized” by the Taliban. One could argue Iraq is a failed state, or two and a half failed states. In Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia and Zimbabwe have all been mentioned as pretty much failed. To review, these are countries which could be in the middle of civil wars or rebellions. And because the government doesn’t exert full “control” of its territory, it could “fall prey to a host of transnational security problems” (says the Brookings Institution) like the nesting of terror groups with global or regional aspirations, organized crime syndicates and their array of drug, people or weapon smuggling; or, finally civil conflicts that tend to spill across borders.

For the Brookings Institution, poverty appears to be a deciding factor: Poor states tend to be weak states. (Or, is that poorer states tend to be weaker states?) It’s not a direct correlation, but it sure is close: Indigent states are often encumbered with weak institutions, or one could say a fair share of poverty is fertile soil for a strong centralized state with limited capacity for governance and/or little regard for its citizens.

Following this path of logic, it may be no wonder that sub-Saharan Africa has a high concentration of weak and failed states. But Africa – and extreme poverty – is not the only problem here. Researchers found that even better performing states have performance gaps (Columbia, for instance, and Mali, Nigeria), which should be addressed by outside interests, like donors, other “partners,” institutions, civil society and other countries. (Is this an argument for providing more of a political intervention role for the African Union?)

I heart rankings
Anyway, the Brookings Institution has classified five major factors that must be taken into consideration for a state’s failed-ness: economic freedom; political freedom; security and social welfare. Taking statistics from a bevy of sources, Brookings has then aggregated this information and created two things: a ranking system for each of the five factors, broken down by quintiles and an overall score, which is placed in groups of 20 percent increments. (For those with knowledge of the U.S. school system, think of the top quintile as the equivalent of receiving an A, the second 20 percent is graded as a B and so on. Of course, this idea metes out a lot of Fs, a mark few working at Brookings may have ever seen.)

For example, Mali could score poorly in two areas – social welfare and GNI per capita (defined below) – but the country’s other benefits – political freedom and security – combines it give the country a pretty high score (fourth best in West Africa).

Anyway, here’s the breakdown and some comment of West Africa’s rankings:

Liberia: Number 9 in the world of failed states (the higher the “ranking” the better): Really not so bad for a country a few year’s away from a civil war. It ranks in the bottom quintile in all categories, except political rights (which are defined vaguely as government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption and political freedoms.) Some would argue this is the right place to start. Tell that to someone unemployed. The trend to watch is the country’s very low ranking in GNI per capita.

Cote d’Ivoire: Number 10. The only thing that separates these two states is Cote d’Ivoire’s slightly higher ranking in economics – GDP growth, income inequality and inflation control, among others – and GNI per capita. It does have a very low political rights score.

Sierra Leone: Number 13. Better economic, political and GNI ranking than the previous two, although social welfare – child mortality, number of children in school, life expectancy – is very low.

Chad: Number 16: Pretty good economic and security grades, relatively speaking. A number of factors help define “Security,” including: political stability, incidence of coups, human rights abuses and if the territory has been affected by conflict.

Guinea-Bissau: Number 18: Economics and politics are pretty good. Are the media (and Africa Flak) blowing this country’s issues out of proportion?

Niger: Number 21: An odd ranking, with politics and economics in the fourth tier, and security also receiving OK marks. What rebellion?

Guinea: Number 23: A so-so security grade pushes this country up.

Togo: Number 26: It’s near the top of the bottom quintile. That’s got to be good for something. Where would the country have been three years ago?

Nigeria: Number 28: Security issues bring this country down to the bottom quintile. Everything else is a #4. But really, shouldn’t it be better?

Mauritania: Number 37: Welcome to the fourth tier, West Africa. Other than economic freedom, which ranks pretty well, this country’s categories all fall within the fourth tier. (A solid D student.) What will happen in a year or two?

Burkina Faso: Number 44: Think of how big jump it is between here and Nigeria. Poor social welfare and GNI scores are offset by economic freedom and political scores and a rockin’ security grade.

Gambia: Number 51: Low GNI offset by a good grade in security and a C in politics. Is that deserved?

Mali: Number 52: The same story of a poor country with low social welfare scores being propped up by good security, politics and economic freedom indicators. Mali is near the top of the fourth quintile.

Senegal: Number 68: Another big jump between two countries, putting Senegal right in the middle of quintile number 3. Relatively, this country needs to improve in social welfare (and political rights) to bring it up even further. Mr. Wade, we’re looking at you.

Benin: Number 71: We’re now getting to the big-boys. Is this why George Bush visited? With Benin, it’s the same old, same old: Bring up the social welfare and GNI and you’ll move up to the second quintile. According to Brookings, the government is doing the right things.

Ghana: Number 84: One wonders how difficult it would be for Benin to move up to Ghana’s level? Ghana is tops for the third quintile – that’s a C + for effort – and still is afflicted with the same issues of economics and GNI. That could mean that West Africa has a long way to go in governance and security, pretty good scores notwithstanding; or, Ghana’s economic growth shoots the country to this territory.

Report cards
To review, it’s no coincidence that West Africa’s bottom three – Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone – are post-conflict states. Government services and stability may be tenuous, but in Liberia and Sierra Leone, things are decidedly looking up. I’ll argue it’s too early to tell in Cote d’Ivoire, which was economically much better off than these two countries and experienced a shorter period of instability and war. (Although its period of instability was longer than most people care to admit. Economically, the country had been falling since the late 1980s, but because it was so much richer and more developed, had much further to “fall.”)

Anomalies make up the next group. It’s hard to grade a country like Niger, which excels in some areas and fares very poorly in others: human rights, security and other issues relating to the rebellion. Is it time people take this issue more seriously? Or, are some – Africa Flak included – blowing it out of proportion?

Guinea and Togo seem like right-on marks. Nigeria seems like a perfect bi-polar country. Some of it happens to be well functioning, other parts of it are completely lost. I have no issues with Mauritania and Burkina Faso, although the next few years will be telling for both (and they could be headed in opposite directions). Gambia is an odd choice for 51, but what do I know? And, the top four of the region – Mali, Senegal, Benin and Ghana – are all deservedly in their places.

But questions remain. If you had a finite development budget and already ear-marked some of the funds for the bottom three countries – or at least the two Anglophone countries and kept a close eye on the near future of Cote d’Ivoire – where would you put your money? Would you aid the top four countries to reward better run governments? Or, would you go start right near the bottom – Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger – and try to prop them up?

Here’s another question: Will it be more difficult for a country like Liberia to ascend – up to say the top of the fifth percentile – than it will be for Mauritania and Burkina Faso to climb into the next level?

My plea for more
Yeah, rankings like this have a certain artificial reality about them. (Do these numbers signify the truth or are they the mirror that projects reality?) And yes, they’re nice for bored political scientists and journalists who have nothing better to do with their weekday mornings. In the end, though, statistics and rankings such as these get people talking about what are the ingredients of good governance and how can people a make their country to be a better place to live. Those are important debates. Not only for those writing the checks, but more for those truly affected.

After living for awhile in and around countries with low rankings – hello, second poorest country in the world – I enjoy looking at the statistics of the developed nations, too. It would be interesting – albeit time consuming to prepare – to see where these other countries land. (I bet you can write a grant for that, right?) Brookings would have to take into account a handful of separatist movements spread among the rich and the fact that a few countries suffer inexplicably high levels of violent crime (for their corresponding GNI) and some populations are not getting the services they most richly deserve. It’s not just sub-Saharan Africa that fails in those areas, you know.

Women in Abidjan protest lack of water

Abidjan is facing severe water shortages. From IRIN:

A third of Abidjan’s inhabitants have had no drinking water for over a month and many have taken to the streets to vent their anger.

"Each time we launch an appeal to the authorities for help there is no action," local resident Georgette Akissi 38, who has been on the search for water for three days, told IRIN.

Some inhabitants have been forced to walk up to 6 km every day to find water, Akissi said, while others are resorting to deepening their boreholes in their backyards.

Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire’s largest city, requires some 500,000 cu.m of water a day but only 350,000 cu.m is available. That has meant that 300,000 people have no water from the city’s central supply, Ebah Basile, executive director of the water company Society of Water Distribution in Cote d’Ivoire (SODECI) told IRIN.

Women took to the streets on 20 February to protest the lack of water, putting up barricades on the main road leading to the east of the city. Police used tear gas to disperse them.

Dateline Ouagadougou: From "dead ville" to riot central

Update: Please see updates on the ongoing riots below

The military is out on the street. The government has closed the schools. Ouagadougou is under orders to be a “dead ville,” meaning all shops will be closed, except, oddly enough, the boutique across the street from our house. “If I see a crowd coming, I’ll close up,” the proprietor said.

Traffic is out, but not its normal chaotic flavor. At 10 am, the markets were mostly shuttered, and I’ve been told that downtown is completely dead. This is all in anticipation of a large demonstration called for today regarding the skyrocketing prices that have afflicted the country during the first two months of 2008.

Last week, demonstrations against high prices turned ugly as demonstrators burned tires, ransacked offices and looted gas stations in Bobo-Dioulasso, Ouahigouya, and Banfora. (In Banfora, vandals also destroyed a statue dedicated to the work and wealth of women.)

One political party, in an attempt to keep pressure on the government, called a “dead ville” for Ouagadougou today, one week after the violent demonstrations in secondary cities. The press is full of accounts of people complaining the government has done nothing but watch prices skyrocket – by as much as 30 percent for some items – since the beginning of the year. Yesterday, February 27, multiple government ministers met the press in an attempt to diffuse the anger around the country and head-off a massive demonstration in Ouagadougou today. They pointed out that food prices around the world have increased, and claimed that Burkina Faso was the first country to offer solutions. With their hands firmly planted on their backs, the ministers announced a three-month suspension of customs duties on powdered milk, rice, sugar, salt and pastas. Also, Made in Burkina products like oil and sugar will also have its taxes repealed. The government admitted the whole program will cost the state 3 billion CFA (roughly $6.6 million).

As I pointed out before, one of the reasons for the sharp increase in prices is government program to crack down on the allegedly wholesale corruption of customs officers who take bribes from large food distributors instead of charging import taxes on their goods. Once that racket was halted, the government claimed, merchants had no choice but paying the import duties, and thus, passing the new higher prices onto their customers. The press, salivating for the names of merchants caught red-handed avoiding bribing customs officers, were greeted with the semi-lame excuse that 155 people had been questioned by police but nothing else was presently forthcoming. (One observer claimed that he would be surprised if even one commercant, much less a crooked customs agent, would see the inside of a prison cell for their flagrant rejection of the law.)

As last week’s demonstrations slowly faded from view, a different debate swept through the press: How the government’s new tax structure has amplified the already peoples’ worsening economic situation. It must be said that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have long complained about the sloppy tax structure in Burkina, which foists much burden on the country’s few formal businesses while largely ignoring personal income taxes.

In 2006, the World Bank Private Sector Unit investigated the (many) complaints of Burkina’s business class and came away with this:

Tax rates as well as tax regulations are among the important concerns for formal companies’ managers (for about 76 percent of formal firms). The tax system is indeed focused on the collection of tax revenues from a limited tax base; in practice, a small number of formal firms and remains cumbersome.

For a poor government like Burkina Faso, which runs heavy spending deficits (and hopes to make up the differences through loans and grants) and heavy trade deficits, the IMF has long argued the state needs to reform the tax structure and begin bringing in more revenue.

This is from the IMF’s consultation with the country in January, which took place January 15.

Ongoing structural reforms include steps to improve revenue performance. Domestic revenues are still low by regional standards, and measures focus on improving tax compliance and broadening the tax base. Reforms to improve tax administration include the computerization of the large taxpayer office, the removal of exemptions, and the streamlining of the tax code. The strengthening of public financial management is another focus of the authorities' reform program. In other areas, structural reforms are aimed at reducing constraints to the business environment, reduce corruption and improve international competitiveness…

…In this connection, timely implementation of revenue administration and comprehensive tax policy measures will be crucial. Directors therefore welcomed the focus on revenue-raising reforms in 2008 and encouraged early adoption of the planned tax policy reform. Directors also recommended against contracting new non-concessional borrowing, and stressed that the authorities should seek new assistance in the form of grants wherever possible.

The details of this new tax structure, at least by reading the media, still remains fuzzy to me. There are those who are complaining the new taxes are inherently regressive and intentionally set to benefit the country’s nouveau riche, a group firmly in President Blaise Compaore’s camp. From a list provided through an anti-tax letter published in a local daily, street vendors must now pay taxes and bars have seen their fees increased; electricity taxes have also gone up; and license and license plate taxes, apparently shelved since the mid-1980s, are now back on the table.

What all this does only complicates matters, says the detractors, as new taxes, mixed in with already high prices and government neglect only hurts the common person.

Check out the map, which is the best I could find.

Update:Demonstrators started gathering at the Stade du 4 Aout (Sector 9 on the map) around 11 am and began making their way downtown. A friend told me he saw a few foreigners’ cars totaled. Another witness claims that demonstrators were seen in Patte-d’Oie (Sector 30), basically on the other end of town.

Another source claims that once the demonstrators hit Cité Ans III (Sector 11), the police responded with teargas, calming the situation. (I think I have confirmation of tear gas.)

Update: U.S. government has closed its offices effective 11:15 or so. (They were probably the only people opened.

Just heard from friend that downtown is now quite hot. I guess I won’t be going to the airport.

Took a short tour around the neighborhood – no amount of violence will affect my daughter’s playdates – and things are very quiet. Barely any traffic on the street. The boutique in front remains open, as does the carpenters next door.

Update: A friend said one can see parts of the city on fire from the roof of a four-storey building in our neighborhood. I can't confirm this.

Also, friend called another friend from downtown, where things are now pretty hot.

Update: A friend in Dapoya (Sector 12) says things are calm. He, however, was speaking from a closed bar. It says something that this bar is closed.

Someone I know just returned from Kwame N'Krumah, the heart of the downtown restaurant and upscale business district and said things are quite hot. People are throwing rocks and burning tires. It's home to many restaurants, some of them foreign-owned. Let's hope everyone has protection for their windows.

Update: It's eerily calm on this end of town, even more so than your regular lunch-time siesta. My friend’s plane has just arrived and being a true coward, sent a Burkinabé to pick her up. With the targeting of foreigners, I didn’t want to take any chances. That being said, he’s driving our car, which has IT plates, basically telling everyone a foreigner owns the car. Let’s hope he’s fine. My friend, on the other hand, may be in for quite a shock on her first trip to Ouagadougou.

Update: Report from someone in the know: “We don’t know anything other than it is pretty hot around the city.” Chauffe, basically French for hot, is what people use here to describe (in this case) violent actions.

No news is good news: There have been no confirmed reports of rioting in other parts of the country.

Update: Downtown has been clear of demonstrators. Only the security services can be seen right now as everyone else has gone home.

Bookkeeping update: The U.S. embassy claims that disturbances were reported in Dapoya and Baskuy, Tampouy and Goungin Nord. These, most likely, have calmed down. A friend reported that he saw people burning tires in faraway Somgande where one of the city's mayors has a house. Those people have also dispersed.

Update: A different friend in the know said that rioters still at Patte d'Oie area and Goughin. Downtown and Kwame N'Krumah area seem to be calm. A different person said there is a lot of debris around.

Update: Things appear to be considerably calmer this afternoon. Demonstrators were still going at it in Gounghin, but I've heard that they have dispersed. I've also learned that roving bands of bandits are still being seen around town, ready to wreak havoc. I don't know how true this is or how many bands we are talking about. Traffic is very light.

Update: Call this anecdote “Escape into Ouagadougou.” A story just came in from someone who was attempting to return to town around noon or 12 :30 pm. The group came in on the Ouahigouya road – between Sector 20 and 21– but immediately after passing the toll booth, saw “a mass of black smoke in front of us…and ahead of us was a bunch of tires people were burning.” The group decided to turn around and circumvent the city to the north and attempt to enter from a different direction. However, they were also stopped by burning tires in the middle of road. They finally entered on a dirt road where tires were burning, but gingerly drove through them. “There were lots of people standing around, but I didn’t see any violence or anything.” Near one of the barrages – due north of Dapoya – there was a large post blocking the road. The group also passed a group of soldiers protecting an office of a neighborhood mayors from any violence. After dropping the group off, the driver attempted to circumvent town on the beltway called “route circulaire” past Dassasgo and Wemtenga, but was eventually blocked by rioters. Eventually, and this is third-hand, he made his way to Gounghin where he ran into other demonstrators.

Update: Lost somewhere in this coverage is how the riot’s affect on local businesses. For those with a “formal” business, one worries about property and stock damage, of course. More than a few people this week expressed fears that if demonstrations were to hit Ouagadougou, bandits and thieves could enter stores and houses during the day. That’s certainly a problem, but we won’t know about for a few days. Secondly, business owners of all stripes have to worry about sales lost due to being closed. I just spoke to a friend in small business and he told me everyone was going back to work tomorrow, Friday. Think of it as demonstration etiquette: we’ll give people one day to vent frustrations, but then we’ve got to get back to work. This is especially true for those others in the informal sector – the phone card vendors, the water pushers, the manual laborers – who don’t get paid if they don’t work.

Update: Check out this story from Afrik.com. BurkinaMom also has a post up.

Update: Some final thoughts. Watched Burkina's nightly news program and was rewarded with 30 seconds or so of footage of violence downtown. It consisted mostly of CRS police in full gear walking slowly and waving guns and a few bystanders trying to figure out how they were going to cross the road. We also were rewarded with a lecture from the Minister of Security. He harangued the more than 200 who were arrested and scolded the others who spent the day causing so much damage and ignoring police orders. For the police services, he had nothing but good words and thanked them for a job well done. A member or two of the opposition made an appearance, also. They were shown sitting down and discussing a solution to the problem of high prices. One idea from the opposition: Price ceilings on staple goods. I wonder how the World Bank will go for that. Finally, people who left their houses tonight reported the city appeared normal, at least in our pretty quiet neighborhood. Bars were full. Roads were busy. After a day stuck at home, it was time to spend some quality time with friends. Just like the holidays.

Chad: Can someone come get the egg off my face?

One could make the argument that Chadian President Idriss Déby is a known commodity, no matter how distasteful he may be. This is not something you could say for the rebels who were knocking down buildings in N’Djamena a few weeks back, especially considering how distasteful they appeared to be.

One thing is for certain is they appear to be at least funded by Sudan, whose government has waged a proxy war against the more (at least cosmetically) Western-leaning Déby, who has welcomed the European Union to station troops on its borders with Sudan to help bring stability to the long-suffering refugees of Darfur.

We made the argument during the crisis that while French President and Chadian benefactor Nicolas Sarkozy should use the 1,500 French soldiers stationed in the country to protect Déby, he should extract some guarantees out of the leader: Like going back to Déby's earlier agreements and guaranteeing a portion of oil revenues for “future generations” and to generally stop harassing opposition politicians and a few other feel-good measures. We understand that a country like Chad may not want a European- or American-style of government, but its people clearly desire basic human rights and deserve a taste of the oil wealth pouring into the country. Hardened and realistic as we thought we were being, it was still another borderline wishy-washy argument that never gained much traction outside of this blog.

It wasn’t all our fault. The situation in N’Djamena deteriorated so quickly and the rebels surprisingly engaged the French military in combat, that perhaps our proposed heart-to-heart between the two leaders never could take place. (Maybe it did happen, and perhaps Sarkozy did try to extract some promises from Déby. But who knows?)

The problem is, less than a few weeks away from rebels knocking on the door of Chad’s State House, Déby seems to be up to his old tricks. That’s clear as it appears that Chad’s military seized two opposition politicians during the chaos following the rebel retreat. Here’s what a Human Rights Watch investigation turned up:

On February 21, the Chadian government stated that an official inquiry had been unable to locate Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, spokesman for a coalition of opposition political parties, and Ngarlejy Yorongar, a prominent opposition member of parliament, nor determine the circumstances of their disappearance. Interior Minister Ahamat Mahamat Bachir later that day announced that Yorongar had been seen in his neighborhood the day before. However, multiple eyewitnesses told Human Rights Watch researchers in N’Djamena that Chadian government soldiers took the two men into custody on February 3. Yorongar’s family and lawyers deny that he resurfaced.

I heart French reform
As someone who wants to half believe the reforming gene of Sarkozy that really, really strives to rid his country’s continuing upkeep of tyrants, I can’t help but notice he clearly now has egg on his face. While it’s not all Sarkozy’s fault, mind you, he certainly has to visibly clean it off before it spreads and the rest of the world’s leaders chuckle themselves silly. (Yes, I’ll stop this lame imagery.)

So, during a trip to South Africa this week, Sarkozy will stop by in Chad for some quick talks. From Reuters:

"The message to his Chadian counterpart will be very clear -- there must be a credible investigation and therefore there must be a credible investigative commission," Sarkozy's spokesman David Martinon told reporters before the visit.

Martinon said the French president would tell Deby that friendship between their two countries could grow only if the pace of democracy accelerated in Chad.

There are a few things going on here. Granted, Africa Flak may have jumped the gun and underestimated the power of Realpolitik in relations between France and states like Chad. Déby may be riding high now, but the time will most likely come when it’s Sarkozy who has to bail him out again. Perhaps this meeting will decide which action French military will take. The argument with Déby has always been: The devil we know is better than the devil we don’t. That may have proved true with these rebels and their mysterious ways. But it may not be true for politicians like Saleh and Yorongar. But, of course, they are nowhere to be found.

The unwritten epitaph on a tyrant

When he laughed, respectable senators burst with laughter,
And when he cried the little children died in the streets.
-- W H Auden

I posed a half-baked anthropomorphic theory sometime ago that went like this: Countries cannot but help but embody some of the characteristics of their leaders. I’d like to reprise that, but first let me start on a different path: the economy.

If the state of the economy is mostly tied up in base gut feelings and emotions and – dare we say it – mood swings, this theory can’t be anymore than half wrong. Think about it. Personal spending and family debt and the ideas of wealth are often tied up in how well one feels about his or her place in the economy and those prospects for the immediate future. Where do people get these cues? From ourselves? Surely. But others, too: our neighbors and peers? Maybe. I can’t help but think our leaders project these feelings. If a leader mimics confidence (and irrational exuberance), why should people not follow suit and go out to buy that third car?

Now, in richer countries, people are often privy to what their leaders do for fun or where they go to relax. In poorer countries – where the personal wealth of leaders are, um, a closely guarded secret – vacations and personal hobbies are best not discussed. It may also be that those richer countries want a chief they can somehow relate to. In West Africa, I’ll argue most people strive for heads of state who will fight for their rights, whether on the domestic front or in the international court.

But let’s get back to the traits of leaders being represented throughout the populace. Good leaders – or at least populist leaders – take specific cues from their people and change their habits accordingly. That’s what makes them popular: everyone sees a little of themselves in these leaders. For example, how did difficult was it for Cubans in the early 1960s to not feel a little more feisty and run out and purchase fatigues? What happens when the calendars begin turning over and people still find these aged leaders in power? Do their subjects still hold that same feelings for them? Do they emulate their senior citizen president as they once looked up to the young upstart?

It’s easy to say that power does strange thing to people. It must be unnerving when the trappings of power makes tapping into that psyche of a people difficult and nearly impossible. It’s hard to hear the cries of the street from the State House. Honestly, when did Castro lose his feel for Cubans? 1971? 1981? At what point does Hugo Chavez become a caricature?

Don’t cry for me, Guinea
It seems I always return to this theme when I am trying to figure out what it must be like to live in a country like Guinea. President Lansana Conte has been in power long enough to not know any better. Last year’s groundswell of opposition that rose against his sclerotic regime is well documented. But the old man stayed on, and the reasons for his continuing grasp of power are also well documented.

Now, the international press may highlight the extremes of Guinea. But the reality on the street may not be so intense, and life around the country may continue pretty much apace. But in the courtyards of their hearts and minds, Guineans must still have a general unease over what is going to happen at the top levels of their government. How can they not?

Conte can’t play magician and puppet master forever. Even if he has been reduced to being a mere puppet, his body may do him in before his masters do. With this in mind, though, it appears he is still winning the battle over the soul of his nation. At the one year anniversary mark of the peoples’ choice for Prime Minister – a condition for calling off last year’s bloody general strikes – it appears the man supposedly in charge has little relevance in today’s Guinea.

From Reuters:

Critics say little has changed in the impoverished West African country, which still suffers soaring prices, persistent electricity blackouts and endless intrigue surrounding President Lansana Conte, a diabetic chain smoker in his 70s.

Even more galling for families of 137 people killed in the 2007 strike -- most shot dead by Conte's police -- an official inquiry into their killings has yet to get off the ground.

…

Conte's presidency, which critics say is controlled by a small loyalist clique, has chipped away at [Prime Minister Lansana] Kouyate's authority.

A December presidential decree reassigning control of government business to a Conte ally was overturned only after Kouyate went to meet the ailing president. Days later Conte replaced Kouyate's information minister with another ally, prompting angry protests on the streets of the capital Conakry.

With the economy once again stumbling along for this mineral-rich country and people complaining of the water and power cuts, the trade unions have planned a general strike for March 31.

The good thing about these national myths is every country has more than a handful to go around. At one point, Lasana Conte may have personified stability, a trait Guineans may have desired back in 1984. Now that his time has definitely come, it will be interesting to see if anyone can pick up a new mantle for Guinea. The country is certainly ripe for change. And, my guess, so are its people.

Development styles: Does general budget support trump project aid?

An official review of Dutch aid to Africa found that money and aid programs are not often reaching the poorest on the continent. The study uncovered two reasons for this: The controversial program of loaning money so governments can purchase Dutch exports and the problems of giving money directly to governments with little oversight.

From Radio Netherlands Worldwide:

The Netherlands gave almost six billion euros to Africa between 1998 and 2006. But that money didn't always go to help those in the most desperate need, concludes the Inspectorate (IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, in this period about one billion euros - a sixth of the budget for Africa - was cancelled from the debts of such countries as Congo and Nigeria.

Frans Bieckmann, Editor-in-Chief of The Broker, a magazine about development cooperation, finds this a nasty business.

"It's a very complicated story, but what it comes down to is that a billion euros have been used for the financing of exports from Dutch business. And the big question is whether the poorest have received any benefits. I doubt that very much, especially if it's countries like Nigeria and Congo."

In some African countries, debts exist because the importers couldn't pay the bills for Dutch products. The debts should really be paid by the Minister of Finance and not through development cooperation, deems the Inspectorate.

A further question is how far the poor have profited from the radical changes that have been made to Dutch aid for Africa in recent years. For example, the Netherlands has introduced a system of general budget support. Governments that fulfill certain conditions can get a sack of money that can be spent according to their own wishes. The idea is to give them more say in the aid.

In principle, budget support is a great instrument for the fight against poverty, thinks Paul Hoebink, a development specialist at the University of Nijmegen. But if it's given to the wrong countries, the poor don't get sufficient benefits:

"If you give this sort of support, you have to be sure the country is well governed. There are examples of countries where this clearly isn't the case. For example, Uganda received budget support while the country was carrying out raids into Congo. Human rights were also abused. Those sorts of things should be reason enough to give those countries less."

Here, take my money
There was a time that whenever I heard the term “general budget support,” I instinctively reached for my revolver. As a method of development, handing over sacks of money directly to governments sounds just a tad more efficient than flying over the ocean and throwing the money out the window.

However, I found this attitude can be shortsighted. General budget support can work, if done correctly. In some cases, it works better than money earmarked to a specific project.

To generalize, an IMF study found that general budget support is preferable when the amount is relatively small compared to the resources of the recipient government; conversely, project support works best when the project – and expenditures – is quite large. The reasons are manifold, but singular project aid often gives full power to the donor, who decides which organizations will carry out the work, where the work will take place, etc. Thus, the recipient government has very little “ownership” of the program and will most likely not lend a hand if the project falters. This has lead to the idea that donors and recipients are partners in aid, brushing over the inherent unequal relationship between the two parties. Project aid also does work when the governments are not very committed in carrying out aid of any type.

On the other hand, when governments are handed money on the condition they complete a project, say building schools, it is the various ministries who make major decisions: Where the schools go, who will build them and who will be ultimately responsible for them. This ownership helps to insure the project is completed and builds capacity (a nice buzzword) for large project oversight. States may also make the decision to divert funds from elsewhere to help expand this project. Secondly, and very importantly, when the donor has near complete control, they have less room to negotiate with the government regarding this project or future endeavors. This is rooted in the fact that for the project to work, both the government and the donor must have similar objectives in mind. (I would also argue that the local population’s objectives be taken into account, also.) Because of the conservations and planning involved at the outset, general budget support is one way to ensure goals are harmonized.

A study by OECD found that general budget support, when working well, is more efficient, thus less expensive than project support. That’s because well run governments often use the money to realize the things they do best, for example building water systems or schools. Budget support also works well when the issue at hand crosses multiple sectors, like AIDS.

At the bottom of this debate, of course, is the fear of diverted aid flows. The cynics in us will say that a government will either divert some of the funds to Swiss Bank accounts or houses in the south of France. Or, more subtly, the government will decide to build the schools in the president’s village or region, thus awarding political allies. The underlying use of aid donors is to create a system of checks and balances in the recipient country so regular people can help guide governmental decisions. (However, the OECD study admitted that budget assistance had no discernible effect on the empowerment of the poor.)

Another issue is monitoring. Who should do the testing – and what outcomes they should observe to insure the project is a success – has long been debated. Sometimes donors are stuck in the corner of monitoring “observable” policy measures only, perhaps even earmarking a large share of funds towards these. This is often problematic. Take the example of monitoring the number of children attending new schools, but not the quality of their education due to a different student-teacher ratio.

There’s another overriding factor: the question whether aid is completely altruistic. The IMF researchers admit that outside strategic and political issues sometimes factor into a governmental decisions. I would also add that outside factors influence the decision of development agencies. Some agencies are forced to obey certain political realities of their home country, like taking part in controversial projects like monetization. There is also the fact that some country directors are bent on empire building and scope creep. And finally, there’s the obvious need of finding a use for all those shiny white 4x4s.