Will U.S. Congress take my food-for-education program away?

It’s hard to keep up with the give and take of U.S. politics in the fight over the Farm Bill, the approximately $300 billion, five-year plan covering all food and agriculture programs in the country. As the U.S. Congress continues to hammer out details on the bill, there is no guarantee that President Bush will sign it into law. He has consistently argued that Congress has failed to bring down the ceiling on many agriculture subsidies, especially in a time when U.S. farmers – and the agribusiness corporations that earn most of the payouts – are profiting from high world food prices.

In a recent move to cut the cost of the farm bill, the U.S. Congress lowered spending on the Dole-McGovern International Food for Education program to a mere $60 million for the coming year, a drastic drop from the $780 million five-year plan previously proposed by the House. As a story in the Washington Post points out, the program – named after Senators Robert Dole and George McGovern – spent $91 million in 2005 and provided 118,000 tons of food to 3.4 million children in developing countries around the world. In all, McGovern-Dole accounts for about 4 percent of all U.S. food aid funding.

But, is it a good program?

Dole and McGovern think so. In an Op-Ed in the Washington Post, they argue:

For just a few cents a day per child, the McGovern-Dole Program has made a critical difference in the lives of children and communities worldwide, promoted American values in the most positive terms, and helped achieve U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. By providing meals to children who attend school in the poorest countries, the program increases attendance rates and student productivity and gives hope to a new generation of impoverished children around the world. The impact on young girls is particularly important. As their school attendance increases, they marry later and birthrates are reduced.

What do others say? For the past five years, the McGovern-Dole program has spent $91 million annually, 85 percent of those funds for distributing food directly while the remaining 15 percent has been allowed for monetization, a program allowing certain U.S.-based NGOs to sell a portion of food aid in foreign markets to pay for development projects. In short, monetization is controversial. Europeans argue that it allows the U.S. government to circumvent export subsidy rules by allowing subsidized crops – wheat, corn, rice – to be sold abroad. More damning (in my mind, at least) is that monetization may work against local traders and producers, who must compete in the market with international development organizations. We don’t know for sure because monetization is very loosely managed by USAID and USDA, who do not track date on the revenues these NGOs make from selling commodities abroad. This, along with other bureaucratic shortcomings, has lead the Government Accounting Office to refer to it as “inherently inefficient use of resources” reducing the effectiveness of alleviating hunger.

As a food-for-education program, McGovern-Dole began in 2002 as an enticement for children to stay in school. It is estimated that 300 million children around the world face chronic malnourishment and many of those children do not attend school. In 2002, GAO analyzed the efficacy of these programs, and first noted the difficult environment they face to: 1) provide important nutrients (hand in hand with clean water and proper sanitation facilities) for children in poor areas; and, 2) create a facilitative learning environment for these kids, which means having adequately trained teachers, proper texts and learning materials and proper facilities which are near enough to most families.

Thus, GAO pointed out that these programs should target at-risk communities with a holistic approach, not attempt a blanket coverage of an entire country with low school enrollment, like, say, Burkina Faso.

The one problem facing food-for-education programs is sustainability. To be truly successful, they must have the buy-in from local communities, parents – who decide whether to send their children to school – and the governments, who must reflect on proper school reforms necessary to make education either more affordable or relevant to rural students. Problem #1: food-for-education programs are expensive, and don’t readily produce results, making governments leery of picking up the tab. The big question: Should education ministries pick up feeding students at the expense of educating others? Most would likely say no.

In the end, it appears the program was less sustainable in the United States than it was abroad. While everyone laments the problem of business interests and pork projects controlling the farm bill, no one has offered a practical solution. In the short term, the death-by-strangulation of McGovern-Dole may be bad for children in places like Burkina Faso. However, it may force the entire political establishment to re-think America’s funky attempts at modernizing food aid.

Why all the media attention on Zimbabwe and Tibet?

Do Robert Mugabe’s ongoing actions in Zimbabwe and China’s policy in Tibet put them in the axis of evil? An interesting question posed by Seumas Milne, in Comment is Free:

…[O]n the basis of the scale of violence, repression and election rigging alone, you would be hard put to explain why these conflicts have been singled out for such special attention. In the violence surrounding Zimbabwe's elections, two people are currently reported to have died; in Tibet, numbers estimated to have been killed by protesters and Chinese forces range from 22 to 140. By contrast, in Somalia, where US-backed Ethiopian and Somali troops are fighting forces loyal to the ousted government, several thousand have been killed since the beginning of the year and half the population of the capital, Mogadishu, has been forced to flee the city in what UN officials describe as Africa's worst humanitarian crisis.

When it comes to rigging elections, countries like Jordan and Egypt have been happy to oblige in recent months - in the Egyptian case, jailing hundreds of opposition activists into the bargain - and almost nobody in the west has batted an eyelid. In Saudi Arabia there are no national elections at all, let alone the opposition MPs and newspapers that exist in Zimbabwe. In Africa, Togo has been a more flagrant rigger, while in Cameroon last week the president was given the job for life. And when it comes to separatist and independence movements, the Turkish Kurds have faced far more violence and a tighter cultural clampdown than the Tibetans.

The crucial difference, of course, and the reason why these conflicts and violations don't get the deluxe media and political treatment offered to the Zimbabwean opposition or Tibetan separatists is that the governments involved are all backed by the west, compounded in the Zimbabwean case by a transparently racist agenda. But it's not just an issue of hypocrisy and double standards, egregious though they are. It's also that British and US involvement and interference have been crucial to both the Zimbabwean and Tibetan conflicts.

It’s an interesting matter, especially for Africa followers. Are things actually worse in Zimbabwe than they are in Congo Kinshasa? Why continue the diplomatic hand-ringing over Zimbabwe when other corrupt nations like Cameroon and Guinea are allowed to skate?

In a perfect world, all countries would be treated equally. Of course, that’s not true. One could make the argument people worry more about fighting in places like Zimbabwe because there is something to fight for. (Would we care if Mugabe was a former liberation fighter and present corrupt leader in Mauritania? Would we care more if we knew Mauritania had oil?)

Politics of despair?
Before we go too realpolitik on you, here’s an interesting reply to the column, in the Guardian’s letters section:

Does he believe we should calmly look the other way as a tyrannical dictator tears the heart out of a once relatively prosperous country? Should we clap politely as the Olympic torch passes through? Are we moving towards a world-view in which progressive opinion does nothing no matter how dire the situation on the basis that there is always somewhere worse and that none of us have entirely clean hands? This seems to me truly the politics of despair.

In my mind, Milne’s underlying question is this: When should countries invoke the human rights doctrines meant to protect people in nasty places? They came into use after the end of the Cold War – and more recently during the “War on Terror™.” Of course a doctrine such as this is completely subjective – the importance of human rights remains in the eye of the beholder, especially when the beholder has a foreign policy and military capabilities. But I’ve got to wonder, five years into the Iraq war, how much muscle remains in these philosophies?

Responsibility to protect (what? whom?)
Born out of the ashes of atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, members of the United Nations attempted to agree on a methodology that would decide who is ultimately responsible to protect citizens or groups in places where they have been targeted for large-scale abuses or loss of life. The doctrine, called Responsibility to Protect, (with fancy post-millennial designation of R2P) attempted to elevate the twin beliefs in human rights and intervention over the philosophy of state sovereignty.

As you could well imagine, R2P has faced some serious rhetorical obstacles. The idea of self-determination and sovereignty plays an essential role in international affairs. As do worries about the misuse of Western “intervention.” (For better or worse, R2P was used in the justification for the war on Iraq, leading Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch to claim “better late than never” is never a justification for intervention.)

There’s more. From Simon Jenkins:

I regard the way I am governed as superior to most. But I am not so arrogant or naive as to believe I can change other states by persuasion or war. The latter is an infringement of self-determination and has proved starkly counterproductive. The greatest boost to the overrated Islamist threat is from just the power projection Miliband supports.

In the non-interventionist 1990s, the thinktank Freedom House charted a steady growth in democracy worldwide. With the advent of the democracy crusaders Blair and George Bush this trend has probably gone into reverse. The cynical appeasement of China and aggressive treatment of Russia and the Muslim world has done no service to democracy. Indeed the cause has fared better in south-east Asia and Latin America, where outside pressure has been least in evidence.

However, those who hold out support for R2P claim the idea has been hijacked by politicians in large, very powerful countries. Intervention has been much more fruitful on the regional level, especially in Africa, argues Thelma Ekiyor of the West African Civil Society Institute. For example, the African Union mission in Burundi; to a lesser extent, ECOMOG’s work in Sierra Leone and Liberia. There’s also the present AU work in Darfur.

For better or worse, the rest of the world has a habit of looking the other way when it comes to Africa’s problems. It’s crisis in countries like Sudan and Somalia and perhaps Kenya or Guinea or Niger that will keep Africa’s diplomats (and perhaps soldiers) busy. With memories of colonialism and poorly planned interventions fresh, it’s probably best this way.

Let’s get real
In the end, the American in me claims debates like this are mere abstractions. The ideas of R2P and rhetoric over intervening before the next “human rights catastrophe” comes down to much more practical ideas: What exactly is happening? Where is this happening? Who are the country’s friends? How powerful are they? Do they have things we want?

No one will ever consider intervening in China over anything. The same goes for Zimbabwe, for very different reasons. China is too powerful; Zimbabwe, in the eyes of those who make the decisions, is not worth the cost. These arguments trump all others. Of course, interventions are not equal. It can take things other than “shock and awe” to change someone’s mind. Like George Bush, we can practice “quiet diplomacy” in the case of China and Tibet or Thabo Mbeki in the case of Zimbabwe. Of course, what has that gotten us?

What happens if the U.S. balks at "free trade"?

A little late, but here’s the big news: Economists Rethink Free Trade.

While ordinary Americans have mostly been cold on the idea of free trade, economists – not used to slogging around looking for work – have often sung a different tune. Until now. Well, kind of.

“[S]omething momentous is happening inside the church of free trade: Doubts are creeping in, writes Jane Sasseen in Business Week. “We're not talking wholesale, dramatic repudiation of the theory. Economists are, however, noting that their ideas can't explain the disturbing stagnation in income that much of the middle class is experiencing.”

What’s more important for the rest of the world is this debate has found its way into the U.S. Presidential election.

The rumble of academic debate is already having an effect on the Presidential campaign. In an interview with the Financial Times late last year, Hillary Clinton agreed with economist Paul A. Samuelson's argument that traditional notions of comparative advantage may no longer apply. "The question of whether spreading globalization and information technology are strengthening or hollowing out our middle class may be the most paramount economic issue of our time," her chief economic adviser, Gene Sperling, recently wrote. Barack Obama's adviser, the University of Chicago's Austan D. Goolsbee, is not convinced free trade is the culprit behind the squeeze on incomes. But he believes many U.S. workers aren't sharing in the gains from open markets and fears a political blowback unless something is done.

On the other hand, presumptive Republican nominee has asked the important question: If one begins pulling out of free trade agreements – although neither Clinton nor Obama said they would – “What are other countries going to think about the agreements we’ve negotiated with them?”

From Africa
For one free trade prospective regarding Africa, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA, has increased trade between the continent and the United States 143 percent since its creation in 2000. (Admittedly, much of this has to do with oil imports.) Trade between the U.S. and Africa now stands around $70 billion, which is last year’s number.

There’s very little chance that even the most protectionist of presidents would cancel something as harmless as AGOA. I say harmless because few African companies presently will be competing directly with American firms. That doesn’t mean AGOA is not without its benefits. For example, creating more trade capacity for some African countries, like increasing government regulation and boosting health (and quality) standards for African commodities.

From Public Agenda:

"There is a perception out there that the AGOA, through its strict and high standards and requirements, is intended to prevent commodities from Africa reaching the US, what do you say to this? " a curious journalist asked Ms Constance Jackson, Associate Administrator of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and leader of the mission.

Ms. Jackson rebutted the claim, saying that the standards are "reachable and attainable and that AGOA standards are not for only African countries, they also apply to US businesses". She added that AGOA and other dispensations are meant to ensure open trading system mutually beneficial to both the US and her trading partners.

It would be recalled that, President John Agyekum Kufour at the Sixth US-Sub-Saharan African Trade and Economic Co-operation Forum in Accra last year, appealed to the US government to consider extending the AGOA initiative, which expires in 2015 to another 20 years.

What free trade?
The one area where Africans have comparative advantage is agriculture, and that's why so many Africans may find this debate rather funny. Very few Africans would agree that the U.S. engages in free trade at all when you take into account the $164 billion its government has spent on agriculture subsidies since 1995. It's these subsidies (along with agriculture tariffs) from rich nations that have held up the Doha round of free trade.

The question is: to what effect? Culled from the Heritage Foundation:

• The Institute for International Economics has calculated that moving from today's trade environment to one characterized by perfectly free trade and investment would generate an additional $500 billion in annual income for the U.S., or about $5,000 per household each year.
• A University of Michigan study concludes that reducing agriculture, manufacturing, and services trade barriers by just one-third would add $164 billion, or about $1,477 per American household, annually to U.S. economic activity. Completely eliminating trade barriers would boost U.S. annual income by $497 billion.
• The World Bank estimates that the continued reduction of tariffs on manufactured goods, the elimination of subsidies and non-tariff barriers, and a modest 10 percent to 15 percent reduction in global agricultural tariffs would allow developing countries to gain nearly $350 billion in additional income by 2015. Developed countries would stand to gain roughly $170 billion.

Doha Trade talks: They ain't dead yet

I wish I knew more about trade and its complexities. But then, some days I wish I played guitar. The Doha round of trade talks – beginning in 2001 and suspended in 2006 – still has a long way to go. Back in 2001, it was hoped that this latest round of trade agreements would unlock global trade in sectors where many tariffs and other barriers still exist: agriculture, services and manufacturing. Also, says the Council on Foreign Relations, negotiators dreamed of “correcting distortions that have effectively barred poor, rural nations from a share in world agricultural markets.”

Of course, negotiations have hit major bumps. But that hasn’t stopped two major committees working under the auspices of the World Trade Organization to attempt to tackle the biggest stumbling blocks – agriculture and non-farm trade goods. The have been busily creating a blueprint to reopen the discussions.

I have to think that part of the difficulty of this round is the growing influence and power of the second world, those former developing countries like Brazil and India and China that will drive the world’s economy in the future. On top of that, African countries are also gaining momentum – the continent’s high growth rate, the importance of its oil and other natural resources, the fact that most parts of the continent is better run than ever – and this is what causes so much consternation from the rich world.

More than a few observers point the finger of blame at that same developed world – especially the United States – for putting the brakes on the Doha round. Farm subsidies were the culprit. Or more tellingly, the U.S. Congress, and to a lesser extent, the White House’s inability (and/or unwillingness) to begin to pare down its multi-billion dollar agriculture support program.

In response, both Europe and the U.S. have tacked downwind, away from broad trade agreements and began concentrating on single country (or, block of country in the case of Europe) free trade agreements: US-Jordan, for example. Or the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements with, say, the African Great Lakes States. These smaller agreements, says Brookings Institution, are expensive to broker and not too terribly beneficial. And the EPAs of the EU seem to be more than mildly decisive on both continents.

However, like Keith Richards, the Doha Round is not dead yet. The World Trade Organization still thinks negotiations finished by the end of 2008, which would be just a few days short of George W. Bush riding off into the sunset. (U.S. Democrats appear to be keener on protectionism than free trade.) Major stumbling blocks remain, but at least a few are guardedly optimistic.

Where does Africa fit in all this? AllAfrica.com recently sat down with WTO head Pascal Lamy, who is in charge of referring the talks.

Here are a few excerpts.

What are the sticking points for Africa in each of those areas – agriculture, industry and services?

Well, it's as difficult to speak about Africa as a whole as it is to talk about Asia or Latin America as a whole. South Africa is not Kenya, Kenya is not Senegal. And in WTO we don't have one-size-fits-all. We have tailor-made solutions depending on the level of development.

On agriculture, African countries are mostly on the offensive. They want the United States, the European Union and Japan to reduce their subsidies [paid to farmers to produce certain types of crop]. They want the U.S. and EU to reduce their tariffs [on agricultural imports] and they will get that. The question now is exactly how much they will get.

On industrial tariffs, African countries are more on the defensive. But only very few of them – South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco – will have to take tariffs cuts according to a general formula. All the other African countries, because they are LDCs or have a low number of fixed tariff rates will be exempted from cuts in industrial tariffs.

Overall… the conclusion of the LDCs' conference which took place in Lesotho – and the majority of African countries are LDCs – is that they are pushing for a deal as they are the ones in this negotiation who will gain the most from a success while paying a very modest price.

LDCs would benefit from duty-free, quota free treatment on 97 percent of their exports. Rich-country cotton export subsidies would be eliminated straight away and other forms of trade-distorting support would be reduced by an even higher percentage that the cuts on support for other crops. Cotton exports from LDCs would receive duty-free, quota free treatment.

If the round fails, it will be bad news for LDCs. This is why a Doha agreement is so important.

How do the regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), over which there is currently so much controversy, relate to Doha? Would the potential for conflict be reduced if Doha was concluded?

International trade is regulated by different sources. WTO does the multilateral part, not the bilateral part. If South Africa decides to have a free trade agreement with India or the EU, it's not for the WTO. But there is a simple medical check that the conditions laid down in multilateral rules for bilateral deals – which is that they are really seriously trade-opening – need to be met. So EPAs are beyond the WTO remit.

Then you have the systemic issue of what the right cohabitation is between bilateral trade agreements and multilateral trade. On this there are various sides of the coin. Bilateral agreements are sometimes good because they acclimatize an economy to being more open than it is multilaterally. But it is sometimes is a big problem because you create a preference between two countries… and then in order to keep this preference, people will resist WTO tariff reductions, which is very bad for the multilateral trading system because it creates what [economist Jagdish] Bhagwati calls a spaghetti bowl of preferences… So it's a mixed bag.

I think that the way ahead is probably to reinforce the multilateral discipline by which bilateral deals have to abide.

If you were an African trade minister, what would you be doing now?

The rules of the WTO on farming have not been that development-friendly because they were drawn up at a time when the weight of developing countries around the table was not that big… Those [who subsidized their agriculture] had the upper hand for a long time in the international system. Agriculture has taken such a prominent position [in negotiations] because of the politics of the international system….

From the Cold War to the War on Terror: Laissez les bons temps rouler

For some reason, Larry Devlin is back in the news. He was the CIA station chief in Congo in the early 1960s and witnessed the rise and fall of Patrice Lumumba and supported the rise of Mobutu Sese Seko. (He was also stationed in Laos during the United States war with Vietnam.)

From the New York Times story:

Mr. Devlin had no problems with bribery, blackmail or other varieties of skulduggery — “all part of the game” for the C.I.A. under Allen Dulles at the height of the cold war, he said. But he thought the order to kill Patrice Lumumba, the charismatic Congolese politician the Eisenhower administration feared would become an African Fidel Castro, was both wrong and stupid, a desperate plan that could easily go awry and devastate American influence in Africa.

“Worldwide it would have been disastrous,” he said.

Lumumba was later tortured and killed by political opponents with the help of the Belgian military.

But here is the real reason for the Devlin story:

Today, Mr. Devlin’s story has new resonance amid a renewed debate about the proper limits of C.I.A. actions to counter a different global threat and their cost to the United States’ standing. The C.I.A.’s destruction of videotapes of harsh interrogations is under criminal investigation. Congress has been reviewing the C.I.A.’s secret detention program and the transfer of terrorist suspects to countries that practice torture, though so far no inquiry has approached the sweep of the Church Committee in the Senate in the 1970s, whose reports quote Mr. Devlin under a pseudonym, Victor S. Hedgeman.

“I think there’s an eerie and disturbing correlation between that era and this one,” said John Prados, an intelligence historian and the author of “Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the C.I.A.”

He said the threat of terrorism now, like the threat of communism then, was used to justify extreme measures that “later become controversial legally, morally and politically.”

To a more favorable view of AFRICOM

As a commentator on AFRICOM and a commentator on African commentators of AFRICOM, I would be remiss in not providing favorable opinions of AFRICOM from, well, Africans. Here, printed in African Path, Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, a professor of English and journalism, argues that domestic political shenanigans help circulate rumors and fear around Ghana regarding the establishment of a second military base somewhere in Africa by the United States, a country interested in cordial relations.

Like I said, it's from African Path:

[W]hat needs to be clarified for these myopic and cynical critics is the stark fact that whether, indeed, the United States establishes a military base in Ghana or not would neither strengthen nor vitiate the global superpower status of America. Indeed, as the cynical likes of Flt.-Lt. Jeremiah John Rawlings, founding-proprietor of the so-called Provisional National Democratic Congress (P/NDC), could readily attest, were he known to be an honest man, forging an intimate relationship and/or partnership with the United States, is the prime aspiration of many a Third World country, and even that of advanced industrialized nations like Britain, France, Germany and Japan.

And so pretending to play dumb, in the dubious name of patriotism, is absolutely no perspicuous demonstration of ideological advancement as these political nincompoops and outright charlatans would have unsuspecting compatriots believe. And if these charlatans and cognitively challenged rumor-mongers cared to know, they would have since long discovered to their rude awakening, the fact that the hitherto self-proclaimed inveterate enemy of U. S. “imperialism,” Chairman Rawlings, educated all his three officially known children right here in the United States, and not Cuba, Libya or Russia.

And if these anti-American protesters knew how to count, at least using an abacus, they would also have learned to their withering sense of betrayal that Chairman Rawlings and his wife have taken more trips to the United States than has President Kufuor during the last eight years. And so what is all such nonsense about, really? It is unmistakably about the eerie fact of the NDC Abongo Boys and their allies seeing naked defeat stare them dead-on in their wicked and ugly faces and having absolutely no strategic campaign agenda but to fatuously grab at the proverbial straws and hope that there would be enough misguided potential voters to toe their ostrich line of reasoning come Election 2008.

Winners lose: U.S. and the final defeat of the Cold War mentality

David Ignatius (yes, I know that I’ve quoted him twice during the same week) makes the argument that the U.S. is the final country still applying the same, tired Cold War mentality to the rest of the world: Point in case, the very experienced Bush foreign policy staff that invaded, defeated, and subsequently lost the aftermath of the Iraq war. (My argument: they were fighting the previous war.)

Anyway, here is Ignatius:

The intellectual matrix formed by the Soviet threat, and before that by Hitler's rise in Germany, needs to be reworked. There is a new set of problems and personalities -- and if America keeps trotting out the same cast of characters and policy papers, we will fail to make sense of where the world is moving.

The piece is an argument about McCain, a candidate truly enmeshed in the Cold War frame; Hillary Clinton, who was part of the first, erratic decade that followed the Cold War; and, Barack Obama, who comes lacking baggage from either time period.

Let’s recast this argument in terms of Africa. One could say that the Pentagon’s desire to secure a base in Africa is an idea straight out of the Cold War. (However, don’t you think its plan for U.S. soldiers to perform development work is quite modern: A willingness by the Americans to accept the importance of non-state actors?) Let’s look at the work of a potential U.S. “foe” on the continent. Instead of stationing soldiers, or writing checks for questionable development projects, the Chinese are investing heavily in Africa (and in mucky places no Western nation dares go), securing minerals for their future and simultaneously helping build some African economies from the ground up. More than a few Africans argue that the Chinese come to the continent as partners, and the U.S., and other European powers, waltzes in with airs of former colonial masters.

My comparison is a little too pat, granted. But there does seem to be something missing from the U.S. African policy; a lack of moving past conventional wisdom or something. (I’d make the same argument about the Europeans, too, the death of Françafrique aside.) Yes, George Bush has progressed beyond simply signing development checks by attempting to tie aid to certain indicators (human rights, business climate, etc.). But is this a true revolution of thought? Or is it just attempting to fix what want went wrong in the past? (One could make an argument that fixing the mistakes of the past is a revolution in itself. But that sounds very bureaucratic, doesn’t it?)

Let’s be honest: African countries of certain serious consequence (i.e. countries that are possible terrorist havens or strident allies in the fight against terror) the administration has thrown those seemingly vital indicators out the door: Uganda, Ethiopia, Niger all come to mind. Angola, I guess. Does Egypt also count?

Although all signs point to a growing, confident second world (and some of these countries are African), the U.S. is finally getting around to paying these countries the attention they deserve. (Another holdover from the Cold War is the concentration of resources on the Middle East.) We could be realistic and say that Africa will very rarely pop up on the radar screens of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Perhaps that is reason enough for the need of storming the Bastille. (Don’t shoot until you see the whites of their ties.)

For second time in five months, shots fired at U.S. plane in Mali

From the Associated Press:

Gunmen fired on a U.S. military aircraft flying food supplies to Malian troops in the far north of the country, but no one was injured in the attack and the plane landed safely, officials said Thursday.

U.S. Maj. Pam Cook, a spokeswoman for the U.S. military command in Stuttgart, Germany that covers Africa, confirmed the plane was shot at late Tuesday or early Wednesday over Tin-Zawatine, a desert village on Mali’s border with Algeria. The U.S. has provided military training to Mali and other African nations for years.

The plane was dropping food supplies to Malian soldiers, who have battled a nascent Tuareg rebellion in the northeast for months, according to a senior Malian military official who declined to be named because he is unauthorized to speak to the press.

The gunmen used AK-47s to fire on the plane, just after it had finished its final drop, the Malian official said. Cook declined to speculate on who fired on the plane and there was no claim of responsibility.

It was not the first time U.S. military aircraft was fired on in Mali. In September, Malian officials claimed – and U.S. officials acknowledged – that Tuareg rebels fired on an American military plane as it was dropping supplies.

Profile of Robert Calderisi, author of The Trouble With Africa

An interesting profile of Robert Calderisi, who worked for the World Bank mostly in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire and Washington DC before quitting to nurse his ailing parents. In 2006, he wrote The Trouble With Africa, an attack on the present aid structure and argued that governments should concentrate their efforts on the five countries most committed to democracy and poverty reduction (the two are linked.): Ghana, Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania and “perhaps” Mali. (I would flip Mali and Uganda, but that’s just me.)

From IOL:

[H]e makes his "impatient" case for Africa. He stresses that aid is not working because of wrong-headed policies and over-taxation. Yes, small agricultural producers such as cotton growers get a raw deal because they cannot compete in the international market. Yes, farmers in western countries are protected by huge subsidies, but that's not the crippling factor. In his view the stumbling block is inefficiency; it is a lack of capacity and skills - swearwords all.

He says in this book that he was not aiming at conservatives but, with the [World] bank linking privatisation and poverty reduction, he is certainly heading in that direction. He is against all that is "politically correct", against the standard excuses of colonialism and slavery for shoddiness and lack of efficiency.

Of course, he is not denying the wretched histories of so many African countries, but he wants to see the continent pick itself up by its bootstraps and get down to some serious agricultural activity.

But before he prescribes remedial action, and there is plenty on offer, he takes us on his magical mystery tour of the continent that began three decades ago.

Calderisi agrees that his criticism is strident, but it is hard to argue against his suggestion for mechanisms to trace and recover public funds, or to disagree with his call for a free press and an independent judiciary.

Calderisi looks post-colonial history straight in the eye and acknowledges that it has been riddled with wrong policies, corruption and greedy dictators.

In which we comment on the State of the Union as seen through the lens of America's relationship with Africa

The State of the Union of the United States of America.

For those people in need, here is the text of U.S. President George W. Bush’s final State of the Union speech, so you can read along with yourself. Also, Foreign Policy supplies a very handy list of the number of times Bush has peppered his seven State of the Union speeches with keywords – Iraq, terrorists, Osama bin Laden. The list allows you to gauge the importance of these issues over the years and where the Bush administration’s attention lay. (Hint: the term “freedom” is a big winner.) One problem is that Africa doesn’t make the list. I Don’t know if this is due to lack of references or what. (I could go back and count, but that sounds to be a rather painful undertaking.)

Finally, for those who don’t know, this is why Presidents must make the State of the Union speech, and why journalists must capitalize it.

First comment: In response to the newly negotiated free trade pact with Columbia, Bush claimed that if Congress fails to pass this agreement, “we will embolden the purveyors of false populism in our hemisphere,” a reference to Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. Purveyors of false populism? I’ve always thought his speech writers were more than a little hokey – Patriot Act, Operation Enduring Freedom and all – but they definitely could have done better than this.

Fighting terrorists and leaders who terrorize
Let’s get on with the speech:

We are engaged in the defining ideological struggle of the 21st century. The terrorists oppose every principle of humanity and decency that we hold dear. Yet in this war on terror, there is one thing we and our enemies agree on: In the long run, men and women who are free to determine their own destinies will reject terror and refuse to live in tyranny.

I’ve never believed this. Fighting terrorism – with words, ideas and weapons – will definitely be a struggle, but it won’t be the defining issue of our time. For that, I think we have to look at the day’s major news event: the burial, with state honors, of Gen. Suharto of Indonesia. The U.S. government spent some 30 years (we hope) attempting to juggle the importance of befriending a strong leader who kept his potentially chaotic country together, but had a serious bloodthirsty streak. (Not just during the invasion of East Timor, either.)

We’ve all come a long way since the end of the Cold War and we understand a lot more about the potentially volatile features of supposedly stable states run by strongmen: the blatant corruption, the summary justice, the non-existent institutions.

The problem is strongmen are not going to go away. There are people in every country that carry a certain warm spot for authority. Perhaps it’s the hope of stability in a multi-ethnic country; distaste for the often-messy and vacuous side of participatory government; the myth that “directed” economies run better; the desire for law and order. Maybe some countries are best run by them. Maybe not.

This much I do know. Leaders of governments and international businesses, NGOs and other non-governmental institutions need to come to terms with how best to approach these strongmen and their people. Sure, I believe that “freedom” is good, but unlike President Bush I don’t lay some spiritual significance to its creation. Sensible people will always argue what it means to be “free.”

In real-world circumstances, governments and organizations have to make tough decisions. The things we now know about bad governance – another catchword, I understand – should help us come up with nuanced conclusions. This is why I think the debate on how to deal with dictators, not terror, will carry us into the near future.

U.S. opposes genocide and supports freedom
Anyway, let’s get to the concrete issues of foreign policy presented in Bush’s speech. Scanning this year’s State of the Union, one has to follow all the way to the bottom of the text until Bush mentions the world beyond the United States and/or the Middle East.

From the speech (Applause has been added by the White House.):

Protecting our nation from the dangers of a new century requires more than good intelligence and a strong military. It also requires changing the conditions that breed resentment and allow extremists to prey on despair. So America is using its influence to build a freer, more hopeful, and more compassionate world. This is a reflection of our national interest; it is the calling of our conscience.

America opposes genocide in Sudan. (Applause.) We support freedom in countries from Cuba and Zimbabwe to Belarus and Burma. (Applause.)

America is leading the fight against global poverty, with strong education initiatives and humanitarian assistance. We've also changed the way we deliver aid by launching the Millennium Challenge Account. This program strengthens democracy, transparency, and the rule of law in developing nations, and I ask you to fully fund this important initiative. (Applause.)

From the Council on Foreign Relations, here is the response of J. Anthony Holmes, former U.S. ambassador to Burkina Faso:

President Bush went through a short checklist of African issues in his speech, reiterating long-standing administration policies and programs in Africa. He restated U.S. opposition to “genocide in Sudan,” while proposing nothing to end it. He expressed his support for “freedom in Zimbabwe,” but did not suggest anything new that the United States would do to achieve it. The president endorsed U.S. leadership in the global fight against poverty but did not indicate an enhanced U.S. commitment.

He called on Congress to “fully fund” his signature Millennium Challenge Corporation, which despite solid bipartisan support has been allocated not more than half of the funding that the administration has requested in the past several years. He also urged Congress to pass a new law that would, for the first time, permit U.S. taxpayers’ funds to purchase food surpluses generated by foreign farmers. (To date, the United States can purchase excess farm production only from American farmers.) While he mentioned his anti-malaria initiative in Africa, Bush reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the fight against HIV/AIDS and asked Congress to appropriate $30 billion over the next five years for that battle.

While signaling his strong support for continued U.S. engagement in Africa, the president did not acknowledge the difficult tradeoffs that must be made, in terms of both policy concerns and resource allocations, as the U.S. government sets its international priorities for the coming year.

Back to Bush’s speech

America is leading the fight against global hunger. Today, more than half the world's food aid comes from the United States. And tonight, I ask Congress to support an innovative proposal to provide food assistance by purchasing crops directly from farmers in the developing world, so we can build up local agriculture and help break the cycle of famine. (Applause.)

America is leading the fight against disease. With your help, we're working to cut by half the number of malaria-related deaths in 15 African nations. And our Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is treating 1.4 million people. We can bring healing and hope to many more. So I ask you to maintain the principles that have changed behavior and made this program a success. And I call on you to double our initial commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS by approving an additional $30 billion over the next five years. (Applause.)

From CFR again, here is the response from Pulitzer-prize winning journalist Laurie Garrett:

The key announcement made in regard to global health issues was President Bush’s call for a doubling of funding for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): this is not new. The call to reauthorize funding for PEPFAR at twice its current level, bringing it to $30 billion, for five years worth of HIV/AIDS programs in 15 countries sounds impressive, but it was included in the White House FY09 budget request, sent to Congress months ago. In both the House and Senate Democrats well surpassed the Bush administration request, counter-offering $50 billion. In effect, then, the President was asking Congress to reduce PEPFAR spending by $20 billion.

The President mentioned plans to reduce malaria illness by half in sixteen countries. Here, again, he has backed off from higher ground. In prior speeches, Bush called for “eradicating malaria illness in Africa,” a far larger goal.

Light at the end of the tunnel
We won’t have Bush to kick around much longer. He came into office claiming his administration wasn’t going to try and change the world. Rather, it was going to do a few things well. Admittedly, Sept. 11, 2001 amended Bush’s dreams. In the turmoil, he found a new lens to look at the world through: terrorism.

This has lit more than a few wildfires. But those issues remain largely outside this blog’s purview. Outside the Middle East and a few other “hotbed” states – the Philippines, Pakistan, Somalia, for example – the administration has refused to admit the rest of the world doesn’t fit snugly into their boxes. Thus, these non-aligned-to-the-war-on-terror states have been largely ignored as the administration has scrambled to keep its many fronts going.

This may not be a terrible thing. As the U.S. has embroiled itself in two wars, the rest of the world has learned to move on. The attraction of terrorism (to the media and to radicals) will wear off as it had in the past. Perhaps the next big issue will be the economic and political rise of those second- and third-world countries this administration – and, frankly, its predecessors –has largely ignored. Talk about world changing.

Zenawi to West: Don’t force democracy upon Africa, but keep the checks coming

From the Guardian:

Western countries should stop trying to browbeat Kenya's warring political leaders into submission and do more in practical terms to prevent poverty, lack of opportunity, and Islamist terrorism from further destabilising the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, has told the Guardian.

"The threat of western sanctions as a response to the current crisis in Kenya is very, very misguided," Meles said. "If it is presumed that the Kenyans will democratise in order to eat the peanuts of development assistance from the European Union, for example, it would be a big mistake."

Placing pressure on resources to influence the post-election process, which has degenerated into violence amid claims of government-engineered fraud, would not work and could be counter-productive, he said.

So says the man who has been in power since 1995 and whose government received $1.9 billion in bilateral and multilateral aid in 2007, the world’s fifth highest amount.

What does that money buy? Here’s what the U.S. Dept. of State reported about Ethiopia’s 2005 parliamentary elections:

After the May elections, serious human rights abuses occurred, when the opposition parties refused to accept the announced results, and in November after the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) called for civil disobedience, which resulted in widespread riots and excessive use of force by the police and military. Although there were some improvements, the government's human rights record remained poor and worsened in some areas. In the period leading up to the May national elections, campaigning was open and debates were televised. The Carter Center described this period as credible and commendable. However, in the period following the elections, authorities arbitrarily detained, beat, and killed opposition members, ethnic minorities, NGO workers, and members of the press. Authorities also imposed additional restrictions on civil liberties, including freedom of the press and freedom of assembly.

For documentation of some of the Ethiopian Army’s handiwork during its invasion of Somalia, taken from testimony from Human Rights Watch:

In the Ogaden, we have documented massive crimes by the Ethiopian army, including civilians targeted intentionally; villages burned to the ground as part of a campaign of collective punishment; public executions meant to terrify onlooking villagers; rampant sexual violence used as a tool of warfare; thousands of arbitrary arrests and widespread and sometimes deadly torture and beatings in military custody; a humanitarian and trade blockade on the entire conflict area; and hundreds of thousands of people forced away from their homes and driven to hunger and malnutrition.

He's right, democracy alone will not pull a country out of poverty. Good governance, however, does help. The Mo Ibrahim Good Governance Index rates Ethiopia 27 out of 48 states. I'd call that C work. Corruption is also important in the fight against poverty and the battle against Islamist terrorists, who prey on crooked governments. But the fight against corruption is not an exceptionally bright spot for the Zenawi regime, either. Transparency International ranks Ethiopia 138 out of 179 in its Corruption Perception Index.

One way to pull a country out of poverty is to make it a little easier to do business there. Ethiopia does rank well against other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but it remains in the bottom half of the "Ease of Doing Business" index when compared to the rest of the world.

Ignoring its own advice to other nations, U.S. government plans no ‘shock treatment’ for ailing economy

File this under irony (or is that ironical?). Maybe development guru Jeffrey Sachs could offer a helping hand.

From the Los Angeles Times:

In the 1990s, when Latin America and Asia were rocked by financial crises similar to the one now dogging the United States, Washington officials were quick with stern advice: Don't bail out distressed banks. Don't intervene when stock market and real estate bubbles pop. Let your overblown economies shrink to their natural levels.

"It was all, 'You've got to be tough and take your castor oil,' " said Joseph E. Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Clinton and former vice president of the World Bank.

To date, U.S. officials haven't followed any of the advice they so readily dispensed to others. They have tried to aid troubled banks. They have slashed interest rates to help the struggling housing and stock markets. They have made it clear that they will go to extreme lengths to keep the American economy out of recession.

Genocide and public opinion

Jim Hoagland, former foreign correspondent and now foreign affairs columnist for the Washington Post, wonders whether Kenya will join the ranks of other countries he once filed dispatches from in capital cities beset by destruction and war – Algiers, Tehran, Baghdad, Mogadishu, etc.

It is premature to compare Nairobi at this point to those other, more tumultuous capitals. But most of them -- as Nairobi certainly did -- originally had serious chances to succeed as workable or even important regional or international centers of governance, and they failed. Nairobi must now avoid their mistakes if it is to avoid their fate.

Hoagland makes the point that the global communications revolution may have connected people in visceral ways, but it has not been matched by “understanding of the Third World's dilemmas or a commitment to help resolve them.”

Unfortunately for aggrieved Kenyans, the nation's most serious troubles in its brief modern history arrive at a moment when international outrage is spread thin in Darfur, the Middle East, Iraq and elsewhere. The United Nations' unsuccessful struggle with Sudan to send into Darfur peacekeeping units that can protect themselves suggests that the once proudly proclaimed "duty to protect" abused citizens from their own governments is degenerating into something like the duty to scold.

Stop in the name of genocide
In a related matter, a story in the New York Times reflects on a far-reaching law adopted by the United Nations in 2005 to allow outside powers to intervene inside countries that are unwilling to stop genocide within their own borders. What some of the resolution’s original supporters claimed was a high-water mark for human rights around the globe has met certain cold realities on the ground. For one, the refusal of rich countries to deploy their well equipped militaries to hot zones like Darfur. Secondly, when troops finally do arrive, they are handcuffed by various roadblocks set up by host governments. (One aspect of this story that must be pointed out: its small sample size. This law has only been tested by the incidents surrounding the issues in Darfur.)

The resolution, nicknamed the “Right to Protect,” was something of a philosophical turning point for the United Nations, a body since its inception always upheld the rights of sovereign states. For proof, see the largely uninterrupted genocides by Hutu power groups in Rwanda, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the Derg in Ethiopia. For the first time, the “Right to Protect” meant that sovereignty could possibly take a back seat in favor of stopping unabated bloodshed and violence.

The role of the public
Piggybacking on a theme brought up by Hoagland: What is the public’s responsibility in stopping genocide? Donald Steinberg, director of the International Crisis Group’s New York office, was a special assistant for Africa in the Clinton administration during the Rwanda genocide. He points out that during the slaughter, the U.S. government debated whether to jamming the hate radio that whipped supporters to a froth and organized the génocidaires or reinforcing the UN mandate in the country.

“But each time some of us pushed for these steps,” he said, “others would ask, ‘Where’s the legal basis for these actions, where’s the public outcry, the ‘Hallelujah’ chorus of support? Where’s the evidence to show that these actions will end the killings?’ ”

It’s an important point. Without public outcry, few leaders will act boldly against killings where a country has limited interests. The festering bloodshed in former Zaire is a case in point. So is the 2006 Israeli bombing of Lebanon – a pretty clear account of a military targeting citizens – which went unchecked by the U.S., who simply sent ships to evacuate the thousands of Americans on vacation in the country and the Lebanese holding U.S. passports.

On one level, Darfur does seem different. A large coalition has been built to force governments to act on the bloodshed. The media certainly has provided (relatively) extensive coverage. Keeping people aware of the killings may have abated the violence, but it certainly has not stopped. Neither have the warring sides been forced to come to the table.

Has the PR campaign against Darfur tipped the balance towards rectifying the situation? It’s difficult to tell. The intransigence of the Sudanese government may come about from the greatest trump card of all: sovereignty, and the belief that the power of the nation state holds supreme. All governments understand it, and in response to external pressures stemming from the “interdependence” of globalization, desire it.

There’s something else at work here. The U.S. invasion of Iraq, whatever the political motives debated in the United States, is largely seen around the world as a unilateral imperialistic attack on a sovereign state. The story points out that 150 countries originally supported the resolution. Many of these countries hail from the third world, and they are presently shying away from the “Right to Protect” because they feel they could be the law could be enforced in their own backyard.

One could also argue that geo-politics plays a roll with Darfur. Many in the West look to China’s patronage of the Khartoum regime as a reason for the political stalemate in solving the problem. It’s more complicated than that. While Washington scolds the Sudanese concerning its government role in Darfur, the two countries enjoy a cozy relationship over the war on terror.

The debate over democracy and sovereignty remains unsettled. But there’s another matter at work here. The convictions of the person on the street. A dedicated clique attuned to the injustices in Darfur is one thing. What about the rest of us? Like Hoagland pointed out, the world at large displays a limited attention span. Issues like Darfur became significant when the public’s attention was already stretched by other issues: Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine.

I tend to take a more positive viewpoint of the campaign to keep Darfur in the media. Think of the counterfactual: What would be taking place there if the public awareness campaign was never hatched? An imperfect solution, yes; but it beats doing nothing.

The Kenya subtext
The subtext, of course, to both of these articles is as unmistakable as their timing. Kenya, a former stable country, is apparently on the verge of chaos. Regardless of the U.S. press’ swing-and-miss on the history of ethnicity and tribalism in the country, ethnic violence appears to be taking place. How far must this escalate before the world’s powers draw up a list of conditions before it contemplates intervention? Better yet, when do the t-shirts and bumper stickers get printed for “Stop the Killing in Kenya”?

School of rock: U.S. military to train soldiers in Mauritania

From Reuters,

U.S. Marines will train Mauritania's military in counter-insurgency tactics this month as the Islamic state straddling the Sahara confronts what diplomats see as an increased threat from al Qaeda.

Next week's arrival of the U.S. military instructors falls under Washington's Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which seeks to help African armies bolster their defences against possible Islamic militant violence.

Although scheduled, the American military training mission comes three weeks after two attacks in Mauritania -- one killing four French tourists, another Mauritanian soldiers -- attributed to al Qaeda members.

Color me unsurprised (but in a healthy way):

"If the Mauritanian government says it needs help in this capacity, you will probably see a receptive attitude from most of the West," one Nouakchott-based Western diplomat said.

Personally, I am much less cynical (and hostile) that most of my colleagues about the prospect of U.S. military training armies of other countries for a limited period of time.

Update on 2007 U.S. Farm Bill

You can file this as an FYI.

Before Christmas both houses of the U.S. Legislative Branch passed 2007 Farm Bills and will have to move to harmonize the legislation into a single piece in a Conference Committee, a process scheduled to begin work around January 21 and possibly carrying on until early February.

I bring this up because these Farm Bills are actually five-year agriculture plans that have far reaching effects not only on international agriculture, agribusiness and the like, but influence world commodity markets and food aid (which the U.S. is the world’s largest donor). The 2007 Farm Bill will set subsidy rates for crops like cotton, but will also set aside money for investment in biofuels (especially ethanol) and make funds available for controversial food aid programs like monetization (allowing American NGOs to buy U.S. commodities cheaply and sell them at a profit in foreign markets to pay for programming) and direct food transfers, which govern how much food aid will come from U.S. farmers in contrast to food bought in local markets.

Making matters somewhat complicated, President Bush has threatened a veto if the conference report does not curtail spending present in the bills’ other versions, including controversial subsidy programs paid to farmers.

Acting Agriculture Secretary Chuck Connor had some harsh words regarding the two bills when he spoke in mid-December to the Agribusiness Club of Washington.

Congress is proposing to raise taxes in order to increase the scope of our farm bill. That's something we haven't done, haven't done since 1933. I can't imagine a time when we have $85 billion of net farm income to be talking about this being a good time to somehow raise taxes, to increase the scope of our farm bill.

Market prices are at or near record levels for virtually all of our major commodity crops. In fact, some economists are estimating net cash farm income this year will exceed the $85 billion figure I just mentioned, which that number is $18 billion higher than what we had last year. Most of you, if I would have told you last year that these are the numbers we're shooting for, you would have probably called me unrealistic. You would have gone back to Keith and said, Keith, please straighten this guy out! Which he does!

This kind of success does give us an opportunity, we believe, to enact some reforms that are necessary for us to maintain the strength of the farm economy that we are seeing today. And that is our goal, ladies and gentlemen: Is to maintain this strength and not have it simply represent a peak followed by a cliff, that some would have us believe, immediately right after.

If we can't help agriculture become more market-driven and competitive now, when farmers are enjoying the kind of economic times we have today, we really do fundamentally have to ask the question: Is there ever a time? And I think the time is now for these types of fundamental reforms.

Connor presented the group with an informal list of problems President Bush has with the two bills. One is the failure of both Houses to reduce the Adjusted Gross Income Gap to $200,000 (instead of the current $2 million), which will prohibit farmers making more than $200,000 per year to receive commodity program payments. (Former Ag Secretary Mike Johanns claimed that 2.3 percent of all Americans earn more than $200,000 per year, and the government would save more than $1 billion if the change was enacted.)

Target Pricing and guaranteed loan rates are two other issues that raised Bush’s ire. Target pricing allows the USDA to peg a crop to an amount higher than world market price, guaranteeing farmers who grew the crop in the past gain a profit. Loan rates is a program to deter loan forfeitures that allows certain farmers to borrow money from the USDA for a specific crop and repay the loan according to market prices of that crop.

From Connor:

Simply put, that is trade-distorting, further trade-distorting, and we are going to hear about it from our WTO trading partners. Is there anyone in this room who thinks we will not - not - pay an enormous price internationally for this action? Anyone here think we will not pay an enormous price for that? And all because a few farm groups who have long-standing policies favoring higher loan rates, those policies dating back to the days of parity prices, and make this case "I'm in, I'm out." And the simple fact is, we are going to pay a heavy price.

The Bush administration has long claimed to be on the side of the little guys, like African cotton farmers who suffer from low prices resulting from U.S. farm subsidies. They've always laid the blame on Congress and its venal supplication to special interest groups (like Cargill) that keeps these subsidies alive and well. This isn't entirely true. Other than proposing certain subsidies be cut, Bush has never expended much political capital to make sure that happens. (As Phillip Fraas points out, the Administration's 2007 Farm Bill proposals called for a $5 million increase in spending.)

With their constituencies forming a much larger block, most Presidents are naturally more enthralled with the idea of free trade than Senators and Representatives, who have more specific local worries: employment, interest groups and businesses. Unless currently running for President, Senators and Representatives may gain political mileage to be anti-free trade; a President, not so much.

The World Trade Organization has already ruled that some U.S. continue to break the law. As the Bush administration threatens Congress with the possibility of WTO-mandated free trade sanctions that target specific industries, it will be interesting to see how this process pans out. Like I said: there's a lot at stake.

What Would AFRICOM Do?

Here lies one of the better stories about AFRICOM to come out of the United States. If According to AFRICOM’s commander Gen. William “Kip” Ward, the new command is designed to bring stability to Africa. The question remains: What does that mean?

Using the chaos and violence of post-election Kenya as a backdrop, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius ponders what the U.S. Africa Command would do if it had soldiers based in Africa: Would the U.S. military intervene to halt the violence? If so, would it go in alone, or work with the Kenyan military? Would it assist NGOs with relief work?

If the U.S. military stays put on that to-be-decided base, what happens if the violence in Kenya began spinning out of control?

These questions are important because nobody at the Pentagon – or the White House – has gotten around to answering them using real-world scenarios. Sadly, Kenya provides us with one. Ignatius’ argument is simple: “Before America sends its soldiers marching off to save Africa, we need more discussion about what this mission is all about.”

Does Africa need a Marshall Plan?

From Jim Kolbe, a Republican former member of the U.S. House of Representatives, is a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund and a member of the advisory board for the ONE Campaign.

Nurturing a vibrant private sector, promoting entrepreneurship and bolstering transport, water and energy infrastructure require bold thinking and new kinds of partnerships. Donor practices must be revamped to ensure they harness local capacities, not undermine them. The Marshall Plan, the cornerstone of the effort to rebuild Europe after World War II, was based on partnership, local ownership and the private sector. It was also complemented by U.S. trade and other policies to help reinflate European economies.

Replicating the Marshall Plan in Africa may not be the solution, given the dissimilar circumstances, and historical comparisons can be misleading. But the Marshall Plan does offer lessons on policy coherence, local ownership and private sector-driven development.

The United States and Europe are responsible for four out of five development assistance dollars. Though most Africans derive their income from agriculture, U.S. and European farm policies make this one of the most distorted sectors in the global trading system. A thoughtful exchange of views across the Atlantic is a must if we are to build a broader base of lessons learned and institutional best practices and to explore new, more effective models for development policy.

The many-headed Hydra beast that is AFRICOM

The proposed U.S. military base in Africa – AFRICOM – has once again reared its hydra head(s) and returned to the front pages of Africa’s newspapers. For those who don’t remember, AFRICOM is a new military command devoted solely to military relations with the continent of Africa, which used to be split up into three different military commands. (A side note: Egypt will not be part of AFRICOM.)

The sticking point, in the eyes of many Africans, is the U.S. military’s desire to station U.S. soldiers somewhere on the continent, “where they can meet face-to-face with their counterparts in African governments and nongovernmental organizations.” The U.S. military currently has official relations with countries in the Sahel and Sahara region, part of the six-year $500 million Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara.

If this base gets the OK from an African nation – which remains somewhat of a long shot – it will become the second U.S. military base in Africa, after Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, which the U.S. government claims holds some 800 special operations troops who combine to do anti-terrorist fighting and small scale development work.

Don’t ask no questions
So, to the press thing. First, the Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua, who had been so stridently opposed to placing a second U.S. military base on the continent, seemed to change his tune after a brief trip to the White House. Making things worse, once he returned to Nigerian soil, Yar’Adua abruptly switched sides again, setting off a series of cascading denials and clarifications, all very well documented by Grandoise Parlor.

One oddity in Grandoise Parlor’s post: President Yar’Adua’s infamous quote from VOA – “We shall partner [sic] AFRICOM to assist not only Nigeria but also the African continent to actualise its peace and security initiatives.” – is not present in web version of the December 13 VOA story, although a strong rebuttal remains in the December 16 follow-up. What happened to the quote? Did VOA excise it after the fact? Or, was the quote taken from VOA Hausa service and then elaborated upon for discussion? Nonetheless, everyone in Nigeria appears to agree that President Umaru Yar’Adua may have – however briefly – altered his position on AFRICOM in the presence of U.S. President George Bush.

In the labyrinth that is Nigerian politics, here is a plausible account from Is'haq Modibbo Kawu in Abuja’s Daily Trust of how the U.S. government twisted Yar’Adua’s arm on this matter.

America had been scandalised by the level of fraud which Obasanjo, PDP and INEC perpetrated in the April 2007 elections, and it joined the world to describe the emergence of President Umar Yar'Adua as flawed. While recognizing him as the de-facto president, the Americans also continued to treat him as a president who faces a legitimacy challenge. On the other hand, Umar Ya'Adua and his handlers needed the imprimatur of the only imperialist super power, the USA, to shore up his image in the international scene. It seemed that the USA decided to withhold that imprimatur, calculating rightly, that it would be offered along the line, as a quid pro quo! The opportunity came with the stiff African resistance to the AFRICOM idea. When Nigeria also expressed the rejection of an imperialist military outpost on our continent, the Americans went for the legitimacy challenge which Malam Umaru Yar'Adua faces. We will invite you to Washington only on the grounds that you will accept to collaborate with us on this doggone business of AFRICOM! It was an offer too tempting to reject and off to Washington did our man go; and as they say, the rest is history.

[A primer on Nigeria's 2007 elections can be found here.]

The bottom line is that while the U.S. would like to protect its oil interests in the Niger Delta, the Bush administration understands (or should understand) a majority of Nigerians oppose a foreign military base within their borders. Why? There’s the question of national sovereignty in the face of perceived U.S. hegemony, of course. Also on the minds of many Africans is the belief that U.S. bases could become targets for the country’s growing list of enemies.

First we take Liberia, then we take Nigeria
In Liberia, which admittedly has closer cultural ties to the United States, the rhetoric around AFRICOM doesn’t appear to be as negative. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is certainly not opposed to the idea.

Some Liberians may even go further. They may see the idea of basing AFRICOM on their soil as an assurance their rattled infrastructure (and economy) could be rebuilt with the help of U.S. forces. Even more optimistic Liberians may hope the setting of U.S. troops may dissuade the forces of instability that could enter the country during its prolonged phase of reconstruction.

From Scott Morgan of Confused Eagle:

If the US Places AFRICOM in Liberia what will the benefits be? At the very least, the infrastructure that has been demolished by roughly two decades of internal strife will be repaired. This includes bridges and roads that are in dire need of repair at this time. Water treatment plants and other facilities can also be repaired rather quickly with US assistance. The US can also rapidly deploy troops to avert further escalation of violence in times of crisis.

The downside of having US forces in the region is that it will paint a huge bull’s-eye on the country. Al-Qaida already struck two US embassies in Africa in 1998. And US Forces did clash with Islamist Militias in Somalia back in 1993. The battle of Mogadishu was discussed in the Excellent book Black Hawk Down. An increased US Presence could lead to US Personnel being kidnapped for financial Profits as well. Who knows what other problems that US forces will create as well.

A real hardship post: U.S. diplomatic efforts at a crossroads

Diplomatic posts at the State Department and U.S. embassies worldwide will be cut by 10 percent next year because of heavy staffing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Washington Post warned last week.

The problem is that Congress has not provided the State Dept. with the proper funds to hire new people to fill the growing number of open posts, and on top of that, hundreds of positions are presently needed for the enormous embassies of war-torn Afghanistan and warring Iraq.

Something else is at play, also.

Transformational Diplomacy steps in
A few years ago Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in a speech on Transformational Diplomacy promised to move State Department diplomacy away from Cold War-era parlor games in Europe and fancy Asian capitols and transfer diplomats where they could be of more use to the realities of the 21^st Century. The glaring statistic was that the same amount of State dept. personnel worked in Germany (population: 82 million) as in globally important India (population: more than one billion). “We will begin this year with a down payment of moving 100 positions from Europe and, yes, from here in Washington, D.C., to countries like China and India and Nigeria and Lebanon, where additional staffing will make an essential difference,” Rice said at the time.

It’s been nearly two years since that speech, and you only have to look at this chart to see the U.S. remains very Euro-centric in the way it carries out diplomacy. Not only does the State Dept. count more embassies in Europe, but my guess is the embassies are more abundantly staffed than posts in other parts of the world. For example, here’s a list of major positions at the U.S. Embassy in Paris.

· Minister Counselor for Management
· Minister Counselor for Agricultural Affairs
· Minister Counselor for Commercial Affairs
· Minister Counselor for Consular Affairs/Consul General
· Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs
· Minister Counselor for Political Affairs
· Minister Counselor for Public Affairs
· Defense Attaché
· Office of Defense Cooperation
· Counselor for Scientific, Technological and Environment Affairs
· Tax Attaché
· NASA European Representative, Space Attaché
· Head, N.S.F. Europe Office

I dub thee: Space Attaché
Some of these positions are obviously not slotted from the State Dept., but a majority of them are. My guess is that below each Minister Counselor for Whatever Affairs lies a large warren full of smaller and lesser Minister Counselors and their appropriate minions.

State Dept. position or not, the U.S. embassy is still responsible for finding housing for all these diplomats, making sure their paperwork is correct to get their kids in school, providing them with desks and computers and chairs, and hopefully even a job for the spouse. A whole warren its own under the Minister Counselor for Management is busy every night making sure these people are well feed and bed.

But Paris is not the extent of the U.S. diplomatic relationship with France. The U.S. government enjoys the following bureaus throughout the country.

· Consulate General, Marseille
· Consulate General, Strasbourg
· APP, Bordeaux
· APP, Lille
· APP, Lyon
· APP, Rennes
· APP, Toulouse

In Marseilles, the Consulate General has five main tasks:

1. Assisting American citizens via the provision of consular services.
2. Promoting U.S. businesses and greater trade between the U.S. and the south of France and Monaco.
3. Articulating and advancing official United States Government positions and American values.
4. Supporting the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet in connection with ship visits to Mediterranean ports in France and Monaco
5. Conducting diplomatic relations with the Principality of Monaco.

For this work, the Counsel General is assisted by five Americans and 21 local employees.

For those who think the term American Presence Post, APP, sounds vaguely like a brothel, they’ll be happy to find out that the three missions of APP Bordeaux are:

• To provide assistance to American citizens (notarials, passports, reports of birth, local lawyers, doctors, and translators, …) It should be noted that these services are for U.S. citizens only. All visa questions and applications should be referred to the consular services in Paris.
• To explain American policy, society and culture.
• To support American business (by helping them to enter French market, information to French companies looking for American goods and services)

Part of the APP Bordeaux mission is to build bridges between French and American companies in the following economic sectors:

• Aeronautics and defense
• Electronic components
• Agriculture, food processing and wine
• Chemicals and pharmaceuticals
• Biotechnology
• Tourism

Blood brothers
I think it a positive statement that the U.S. government has a very close relationship with France, one of its oldest allies. However, in these times of instant communication, of multi- multi-national organizations, of ministerial-level meetings held every few months, how easy is it for a high ranking U.S. official to speak directly to a high ranking French official? Very easy, indeed.

As the country turns the calendar over to year seven in the seemingly unending Global War on Terror, anyone can make the argument that the average French person should be well aware of Uncle Sam’s good aims and intentions. At the expense of whom, however? As much as the average French person may gasp at this, the U.S. and France pretty much share a common culture. This is not just a product of the history of Christendom or of American cultural imperialism as much as 21^st century globalization. It is an understanding of the major differences that exist between those two countries and the majority of people in other nations like, say, Pakistan or Afghanistan or Nigeria.

This is a zero-sum game: Every APP, every Consulate in France bleeds U.S. resources from countries much more critical, much less understanding of U.S. policies and motives. The question the U.S. government must ask itself: How much more important is it that a French person hears about U.S. customs directly from the APP in Toulouse than a Nigerian in Kano understands U.S. policy initiatives?

End corporate welfare as we know it
This does not nullify the argument for a heavy U.S. presence throughout the French countryside. Many Americans reside in France and many more vacation there. Also, France and the U.S. share many business contacts, and the U.S. government makes no bones about its responsibility to promote U.S. business interests overseas. In a time when business concerns often trump even the most political interests, a majority of State dept. overseas positions fulfill the task of helping businesses navigate foreign labor practices, civil rights laws, environmental codes and corruption issues.

In my view, it only makes sense that the U.S. business community begins supporting the State dept. to fund these positions. Extending the government-business partnership and underwriting certain posts could guarantee that U.S. business interests are fully realized in other countries. It could also guarantee that positions are full in embassies in countries now politically and economically important to the new world order.

The MCC funding debate: What happens when they take away the carrot?

In New York Times on December 7, a story appeared about AIDS in Africa the budget fight over U.S. President George Bush’s Millennium Challenge Fund. The rub against the five-year, $4.8 billion plan is that it moves at a snail’s pace to spend its money and pull poor countries out of poverty. Presently, only $115 million of the funds have been allocated.

In the eyes of the U.S. Congress, that’s not how the organization is supposed to work. During budget proceedings, the story says, the House of Representatives slashed the administration’s $3 billion budget request to $1.8 billion. The Senate proposed $1.2 billion, and claimed no more up-front money be spent for future five-year projects. Instead, everything must be fully funded at the beginning of the project. Government leaders of country’s eligible to receive the money will just have to believe that the U.S. government will come up with its share of the funds in the future.

In a rare inquiry regarding the outcomes of federal programs, Senator Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont, asked about effects of the U.S. foreign aid budget. “Do we cut maternal health?” he asked. “AIDS? Malaria? Do we cut refugees? The only thing that’s got a blank check is the war in Iraq.”

Beating to a different drum
Of course, MCC was always supposed to be different, and being set apart makes it an easy Congressional target – especially during a possible economic downtown.

When it was first announced by George Bush in a March 2002 speech, MCC would be different in two ways: First, it would coordinate a large amount of money specifically earmarked for building a country’s infrastructure, instead of funding a series of smaller projects through piecemeal funds; secondly, and most importantly, MCC would only work with poor governments exhibiting sound economic and political policies. To become eligible, countries must obtain passing scores in three major criteria: Ruling justly; investing in people, which tallies how much governments invest in health care, primary education, etc.; and finally, economic freedom, including regular World Bank stuff like how easy it is to open a business, the quality of regulatory bodies, fiscal policy, etc.

Governments who pass this threshold are then supposed to come up with a plan of how they’ll spend the money. They’re encouraged to think big and address a fundamental problem facing their people. For example, Burkina Faso submitted the first country plan, a $12.9 million project to focus on improving girls’ education across the country.

So what went wrong?
Ever since Bush’s March 2002 speech, the program has hit a series of bumps and roadblocks – some of its own making, some of the government’s making and some the fault of other countries. First, it took nearly a year to draft the legislation and send it to Congress and another year after that for both houses to pass the legislation and send the bill back for the president’s signature. That puts us at February 2004. Three months later, the Senate confirmed Paul Applegarth, MCC’s first director. That month, the staff reaches 20.

It takes another full year before MCC signs its first compact – with Madagascar. Not long after that, President Bush meets with a few African leaders who complain the process is too-time consuming and shrouded in too much bureaucracy. It wasn’t too long after that when Applegarth tendered his resignation.

(When MCC staffers traveled to Burkina Faso after Applegarth’s resignation, they made sure everyone in Ouagadougou knew their former boss was to blame for some of the agency’s problems: This known control freak sat in on every interview, right down to the office secretaries. By design, the program is only supposed to employ 200 people, for better or for worse, to keep it from becoming an overfed bureaucratic monster. However, it didn’t reach 105 employees until April 2005.)

During the second half of 2005 European countries were also energetically discussing aid policies and strategies. Preparing for a G8 summit at Gleneagles in Scotland, proposals were on the table to double aid budgets and tie it to .7 percent of each country’s GDP. The U.S. is famously parsimonious when it comes to development aid to foreign countries. Americans claim that their smaller percentage of GDP makes up a bigger amount than most individual European countries.

Another difference between the two continents’ aid strategies is that European governments often gather money from many different resources, pooling it together to tackle a specific problem, like malaria.

As Robert Guest, author of the Shackled Continent: Power, Corruption and African Lives, pointed out on NPR interview in June 2005, this is exactly the opposite of what the U.S. does, which ties aid money very closely to the continuing governmental performance of each country. He points out the possible risks that exist between the two philosophies are that Europeans spend money too quickly to be effective and Americans spend it too slowly to be effective.

One reason it took so long for accepted countries to receive MCC funds is the number of bureaucratic hurdles set up set up by the organization. For example, MCC forms are not only complicated, Guest says, but couched in “very American ways of talking.” He wasn’t being a jerk. I’ve seen early forms from the Clinton Foundation’s HIV/AIDS Initiative full of idiomatic phrases that are very difficult to understand for better than average English speakers. If the MCC forms were anything like the Clinton Foundation, it’s a point well taken.

One of the issues here is that developing countries don’t have a lot of capacity to quickly fulfill all the requirements demanded by MCC. Well educated government officials are a commodity, and many governments can’t free up people from other work. Keeping the whole process transparent forces governments to create new structures – a difficult proposition for any administration.

What’s most telling to me is that two documents critiquing MCC from mid-2005 – the Guest interview and a report from the Brookings Institution – rehash the same complaints people are still leveling against the organization in this month’s New York Times story. For example, Representative Nita Lowey, D-New York, recently traveled to Ghana to find the country’s $547 million to develop a modern agriculture economy is still not very far along.

The problem here isn’t whether the philosophy behind MCC is good or not. Most people will agree it’s a worthy cause: After Americans have thrown away untold billions propping up dictators over the years, rewarding well run countries should feel good. Tying aid to government performance is also a fine idea. Same goes for demanding that governments becoming stakeholders in this process by prioritizing their needs and then following through on projects.

The question on most people’s minds is whether MCC can overcome its setbacks or whether these problems represent the cost of doing business in a different way.

Spare a dime, brother?
Someone better find an answer quickly. If the Senate and House cannot work out an agreement to stave off MCC funding cuts, Burkina Faso, which toiled for two years to draft its plan, will receive no money.

Burkina Faso’s Prime Minister, Tetrius Zongo, spent five years in the U.S. as his country’s ambassador. He understands the bull and bluster of U.S. politics. So far, he sounds pretty scared. That’s not a good sign.

From the New York Times story:

Burkina Faso has gone to great lengths to meet the agency’s good governance standards. The agency gave it a $13 million grant to improve girls’ education, which the country used to build, among other things, schools with day care centers so school-age girls do not have to stay home to look after their younger siblings.

Identified by the International Finance Corporation as one of the most difficult places in the world to do business, Burkina Faso has also halved the number of days it takes to start a business, and reduced by a third the cost of registering property.

In small, poor countries like Burkina Faso, every burp and hiccup of an aid agency like the Millennium Challenge Corporation is news — and often front page news. David Weld, the agency’s country director for Burkina Faso, said he did not know how he could face people there if Congress did not come through with enough money to help them.

“What type of message does that send to Burkina Faso, a country that has spent a huge amount of political capital and money on this process?” he asked. “What does that tell the Togos, the Nigers that want to become eligible? It tells them: Do everything like Burkina Faso, make all these reforms, spend millions of your own money, and then maybe at the end we might be able to sign a compact with you — or maybe not.”

A final note: The photos accompanying the newspaper story were awesome (a very proper word to describe photographs). More of the photographer’s work can be found here.